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Article 1

CHIMEL v. CALIFORNIA-A POLICE RESPONSE
Frank Carrington*
I.

Introduction

In August of 1969, Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas addressed
the United States Senate to express his concern "that the U.S. Supreme Court
in a large number of untenable decisions has been seriously weakening the Government's ability to combat the growing menace of crime in the United States."'
No one could be better qualified than Senator McClellan to express this concern,
for he has done as much as any figure in this country to turn the tide of the
rising crime wave.2 The Senator continued:
For as the [United States Supreme] Court has moved on and on to more
and more attenuated questions of fairness, the single-minded pursuit by
some jurist [sic] of individual rights defined by an 18th century ideal, but
applied to a 20th century society, is threatening to alter the nature of the
criminal trial from a test of the defendant's guilt or innocence to an inquiry
into the propriety of the policeman's conduct.3
The case of Chimel v. California," decided on June 23, 1969, vividly illustrates the truth of Senator McClellan's words. Chimel overruled at least nineteen
years of prior Supreme Court precedent and drastically restricted the right of
the police to make searches incident to a lawful arrest. The adverse impact of
the Chimel decision on the effectiveness of law enforcement in this country is
only beginning to be felt; but even now acute practical problems for the
policeman "on the street" have arisen as a result of the decision.
This article will discuss the Chimel case and its effects on the police.5 The
decision itself will be analyzed, and a description of the problems raised by the
decision will be presented, with particular emphasis*on the manner in which
B.A., Hampden-Sydney College; LL.B., University of Michigan; LL.M., Northwestern
University. The author is a graduate of Northwestern University Law School's Police Legal
Advisor Program. He has served as a prosecutor's investigator in Lynchburg, Virginia, as a
criminal investigator for the United States Marine Corps, as a special agent in the Intelligence
Division of the Treasury Department, and as a legal advisor to the vice squad of the Chicago
police department and the Gary police department. He is currently serving as police legal
coordinator for the Denver police department, and is legal counsel to the Colorado Association
of Chiefs of Police.
1 115 CONG. REc. S9565 (daily ed., Aug. 11, 1969).
2 For example, Senator McClellan was the moving force behind the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No., 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 18, 42 U.S.C.), particularly the-landmark section 701 of that Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
3501-02 (Supp. IV, 1965-68). This section attempts'to limit the scope of Supreme Court
decisions dealing with admissibility of confessions (e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)) and eyewitness identifications (e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. '263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)).
3 115 CONG. REO. S9566 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1969).
4 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
5 In evaluating the practical effects of the Chirnel case on the police, the writer will be
speaking from the point of view of an attorney-policeman whose function is to advise the members of a large (1,050-man) police department on the conduct of searches and seizures and
arrests in light of the court decisions. This advice is often rendered on-the-scene, so many of
the examples will be based on personal experiences.
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the overbroad wording and lack of guidelines in the majority opinion have
resulted in the frustration of excellent, conscientious police work. In addition,
a model statute or rule of criminal procedure will be suggested as a solution to
some of the problems created by Chimel.
The theme of this article is that while the majority opinion in Chimel is
quite sweeping in telling the police what they may not do, the same opinion
furnishes few if any guidelines as to what police may lawfully do in the critical
search-incident-to-arrest, area. The working policeman is continuously, called
upon to make instant decisions. .In view of the constant expansions and refinements of :the exclusionary rule being made by today's courts, the policeman's
decision, if incorrect, can often result in the loss of the entire case. It is submitted that the great majority of today's law enforcement officers want to. act
in a proper and constitutional manner; they need and deserve clearer guidelines
for their actions, particularly from the highest tribunal in the country.
The Chimel opinion is best understood in the context of the history of the
law of search incident to arrest. The majority and dissenting opinions7 both
discussed this history at 'some length, pointing out that the decisions in this
area have been "far from consistent."'
The law of search incident to arrest evolved from persons to vehicles to
premises. Searches of persons incident to arrest "to discover and seize the fruits
or evidences of crime" were first recognized, in dictum, by the Supreme Court in
Weeks v. United States,' decided in 1914. In 1925 the warrantless search of an
automobile was upheld by the Court in Carroll v. United States."0 Seven months
later, in Agnello v. United States," the Court extended the right of search to
apply to the place where the arrest was made, citing Carroll and Weeks as
authority. Thus, by 1925, the Court had established a broad-based police right
to make searches incident to arrest.3
Prior to Chimel, the law had taken four major shifts concerning the scope
of such searches. The first shift away from the broad scope of arrest-based
searches came in the 1931 case, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States. 4
In that case, agents had arrested one Gowen and seized papers from an office
on the premises incident to the arrest. The Supreme Court ruled that the
papers should have been suppressed, noting that there had been ample oppor6 See, e.g.,'Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). in which the Court ruled inadmissible fingerprints taken pursuant to an arrest made without probable cause.
7 The majority consisted of Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the opinion, Chief Justice
Warren, and Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred specially, expressing reservations about the impact of Chimel on local police. Justices, White and
Black dissented Former Justice Fortas heard the argument but did not participate in the

decision.

8 Chimel v. -California, 395 U.S, 752, 755 (1969) (Stewart, J.). Similarly, Mr. Justice
White stated: "Few areas of the law have been as subject to shifting constitutional standards
over the last 50 years as that of the search 'incident to an arrest.'" Id. at 770.
9 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)..
10 267 U.S. 132 '(1925).
11 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
12 Id. at 30.
13 See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), where the Court sustained the
seizure of items.not named in a search warrant because the prohibition agents who made the
seizure had made a lawful arrest on the premises while executing the search warrant. Id. at
198-99.

14

282 U.S. 344 (1931).
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tunity for the officers to procure a search warrant." . United States v. Lefkowitz 6
also limited the right, of search incident to arrest."'
Harris v. United States" represented the second shift and returned to a
broad scope of search -incident to, arrest. Harris, decided in 1947, upheld the
search 'of defendant's, four-room' apartment by officers armed with an arrest
warrant but no search warrant. Harris was arrested, for interstate transportation
of a forged check; but the search uncovered altered selectiie service documents,
and the use of these documents to convict Harris of a selective service violation
was sustained.19'
The third shift came one year later in Trupiano v. United States.2" In that
case the Supreme Court ruled that the ,seizure of an illicit still was unlawful
because the agents did not procuxe a search warrant, although they had. ample
time to do so. The Court stated'-that law enforcement agents must make their
searches with warrants ',wherever reasonably practicable. ' "al
The Supreme Court made its final pre-Chimel shift, and again broadened
the scope of search incidentto arrest, -in, the. 1950 case of United States v.
Rabinowitz." Rabinowitz, overruling Trupiano, sustained the search of the
defendant's one-room business office as properly incident to his arrest on an
arrest warrant. The Rabinowitz test, which had survived until Chimel was
decided, was: "not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
'whether the search was reasonable. 2 s
Thus, we may illustrate the shifts in the permissible scope of warrantless
but arrest-based searches:
Narrow bcope ot
Arrest-Based Searches

Broad Scope of
Arrest-Based Searches
Weeks v. United States (1914)
Carroll v. United'States (1925)
Agnello v. United States (1925)"" Harris u., United States

Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States (1931)
Lefkowitz v., United States (1932)

(1947)

Harrisn States' United
(1947))
United States v.Rabinowitz' (1950)

v.
'€

Trupa

° v.

United States

(1948)

Against this background, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the Chimel case.24
15 Id. at 358.
16 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
17 The Court in Lefkowitz seemed to base its'decision, at least in part, on the fact that "the
searches were exploratory and general and made solely to find evidence of respondents' guilt."
Id. at 465. The prohibition against searching for items of only evidentiary value was discarded
by the Supreme Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
18 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
19 Thus Harris also stood for the principle that items of,evidence ot me commission ot one
offense may be seized in the course of a search concerning a different offense. Whether Chimel,
which overruled Harris as to -the permissible scope of an arrest-based search, also overruled
Harris as to this ,point will be discussed below.
20 334 U.S. 699 (1948)-.
21 Id. at 705.
22 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
23 Id. at 66.
24 393 U.S. 958 '(1968).
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The facts of Chimel are relatively simple. In the late afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers went to the Santa Ana home of Ted Steven
Chime 25 to arrest him for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers had procured
an arrest warrant for Chimel at about 10:30 that morning; they had procured
no search warrant. When the officers arrived, Ghimel was not home; but the
officers were let in by Chimel's wife, and there they waited until he arrived ten
or fifteen minutes later. The officers arrested Chimel and, over his protests,
conducted a thorough search of the entire three-bedroom house, the garage,
attic, and workshop. They found and seized coins taken in the burglary. At
Chimel's trial the coins were admitted into evidence over his objection, and he
was convicted on two counts of burglary. A California District Court of Appeal26 and the California Supreme Court2 7 both upheld the conviction.
On June 23, 1969, the United States Supreme Court reversed Chimel's
conviction,2" in the process overruling Rabinowitz and Harris insofar as those
cases pertained to the scope of a search of premises incident to a lawful arrest.29
In so doing, the Court has nearly obliterated the right of the police to make
such searches.
The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Stewart, began with a discussion of the history of the law of search incident to arrest; it then criticized
the rationale of Rabinowitz and cited Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in that
case with approval. Some historical background of the fourth amendment was
reviewed, and McDonald v. United States" was cited for the principle that the
fourth amendment requires the interposition of a magistrate between the police
and the citizens, absent exigent circumstances. Mr. Justice Stewart then enunciated the "Chimel rule":
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach
in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, there
fore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
25 The name of the petitioner in Chimel v. California may be one of the most consistently
mispronounced in legal history. The California Attorney General's office advises that it is pronounced "ChI * mel" - "Chi" as in chimes, "mel" as in melon.
26 People v. Chimel, 61 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
27 People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436,439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968). In sustaining the conviction, the California Supreme Court found that, although the warrant for Chimel's
arrest was defective as conclusory under People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418, 439 P.2d 321, 67
Cal. Rptr. 409 (1968), the arrest itself was legal because the officers had knowledge of facts
constituting probable cause for Chimel's arrest independent of the warrant.
28 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
29 Id. at 768.
30 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching
any room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that matter,
for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed- or concealed
areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized
exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.
The "adherence to judicial process" mandated by the Fourth Amendment
requires no less.3 1 (Footnote omitted.)
The sentence quoted above concerning "well-recognized. exceptions" to, the
warrant requirement is footnoted to Katz v. United States.32 The Court's
footnote will be discussed in detail later.
Justice Stewart then cited Preston v. United States3 as authority for the
Chimel rule that he had just enunciated. In Preston, the Supreme Court had
held unlawful the search of an automobile in which three men had been arrested
for vagrancy, basing the illegality of the search on the facts that the car had
been towed to a garage and its occupants taken into custody before the search
was made. The Chimel opinion quoted from Preston:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by
the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent *thedestruction of evidence of the crime-things which might easily happen where
the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate
control. But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in
time or place from the arrest.3 4
The majority opinion in Chimel, however, omitted the sentence that immediately follows in Preston. This sentence says: "Once ah accused is under arrest
and in custody, then a search made at anotherplace, without a warrant, is simply
not incident to the arrest."3 5 (Emphasis added.) Thus it would appear that
remoteness in time and place from the scene of the arrest in the automobile was
0 The fact that Mr. Justice
the real rationale underlying the holding in Preston."
Black, who wrote the opinion in Preston, dissented in Chimel lends credence to
this view. For in Chimel the search of the house was made at the time and place
of the arrest; Mr. Justice Black's dissent certainly seems to indicate that he took
a much more restrictive view of his language in Preston than did the Chimel
majority.
The language quoted from Prestonin the Chimel opinion is footnoted to say:

31 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
32 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
34 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969), quoting from Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364. 367 (1964).
35 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
36 Justice Black continued in Preston:
The search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and his companions had
been arrested and taken in custody to the police station and the car had been towed
to the garage. At this point there was no danger that any of the men arrested could
have used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime.
...Nor, since the men were under arrest at the police station and the car was in
police custody at a garage, was there any danger that the car would be moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction. Id. at 368.
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-Our-holding today is of course entirely consistent with the recognized principle that, assuming the existence of probable cause, automobiles and other
is not practicable to
vehicles may be searched without warrants "where ,it
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153; see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160.37

This footnote seems to indicate clearly that a vehicle may be searched incident
to an arrest, or'even where no arrest has taken place, so long as there is probable
3
cause for the search and the vehicle retains its character of movability 8
Finally, the Chimel opinion expressly overruled Rabinowitz and Harris"on
their own facts, and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with
those that we have endorsed today .... "8 Based on the above reasoning the
Court concluded that the scope of the search in Chinel was unreasonable and
that the conviction must be reversed.
Recall 'iow the words of Senator McClellan expressing his concern that the
United States Supreme Court decisions are "threatening to alter the nature of
the criminal trial from a test of the defendant's guilt or innocence to an inquiry
into the propriay of the policeman's conduct."'4 This is certainly true of the
Chimel decision. The question of Chimel's guilt had been determined in a trial,
and his conviction had been upheld by two appellate courts including the California Supreme Court. The truth of the matter was that coins taken in a burglary were, in fact, found in the house of Chimel who was subsequently convicted
for that burglary. Nevertheless, the question of actual guilt was disregarded by
the Court; as Senator McClellan noted, the inquiry was directed entirely to the
propriety of police conduct.
The policeman's conduct in the Chimel case itself was neither oppressive
nor arbitrary. 4 While it is highly unlikely that terms such as "Agnello," "Harris,"
or "Rabinowitz" were going through the minds of the Santa -Ana detectives
that fall afternoon as they approached Chimel's house,' it is clear that their conduct was within, the bounds of approval of nineteen years of United States
Supreme Court precedent. Further, the search they conducted was subsequently
approved by the California Supreme Court, one of the most "liberal". courts in
the nation.
Chimel, then, is an example of a five-justice majority (with another justice
reluctantly concurring) of the Court "second-guessing" the Santa Ana police, the
California Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court that decided
Rabinowitz in 1950. The legal authority of the Chimel Court to engage in this
"second-guessing" is beyond question (although every decision, such as Chimel,
37 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1969).
-38 But see Colosimo v. Perini, 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969); State v. Reyes, 6 BNA CRIm.
L. RPTR. 2220 (N.M. Dec. 1, 1969). Both cases held illegal the search'of automobiles Where
the car itself remained at the scene after the defendant had been removed.
39 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
40 115 CONG. REc. S9566 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1969); see text accompanying note 3 supra.
41 For purposes of comparison, see, for instance, the police conduct described in Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722-23 (1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1961).
42 Mr. Justice Stewart noted that the police officers advised Chimel that they were conducting the search "on the basis of the lawful arrest." Chimel v. California, 395 'U.S. 752, 754
(1969). This would indicate that the officers were, in fact, aware of at least the basic elements
of the law of search and seizure.
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that: overruls long-standing precedents erodes the d6ctrind of stare'decisis and
weakens the stability and predictability of our system). There 'remains, hov-ever,
the deeper question of fundamental'fairniess to society as a whole;,for the "singleminded pursuit by some.jurisf [sic] of individual sights 'defined bt an 18th century
ideal, but applied to a 20th century society,! 4 can have a tremendous effect on
the safety and domestic tranquility -of our, society today., The propriety of the
policeman's conduct was all that the Court chose to consider in Chimel, and. the
impact of its decision bn law enforcemeiit was utterly. disregarded by the five-.
justice majority.
Mr. Justice 'Harlan, who concurred specially in Chinel, at least recognized
the possibility of the adverse effect of Chimel on the effectiveness, of law enforcement. In what may be the most significant statement in the' entire 'decision,
he noted:
The only thing- that has given me pause m voting to overrule Harris and
Rabinowitz is that as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.(1961), and
Ker v. California,347 U.S. 23 (1963), every change in, Fourth Amendment
law must now be obeyed by state officials facing widely different problems
of local law eriforcement. We simply do not know the exteni to which cities
and towns'acrdss the Nation are prepared to administer the greatly expanded
warrant system which will, be required by today's decision; nor can we say
with assurance ttat in each "and every local situation, the warrant 'requirement plays an essential role in the protection of those fundamental liberties
protected against state infringelfient by the Fourteenth Amendment.,
Thus, one is now faced with the dilemma, envisioned in niy separate
opinion in Ker, 374 U.S., at 45-46, of -choosing between vindicating sound
Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns,
long recognized to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendinent before
Mapp and Ker'came on tlie books, or diluting the Federal Bill of Righits in
the interest of leaving the States~at
least some elbow room in their methods
45
of criminal law enforcement.
The Chimel majority showed no such concern for the states' very real law enforcement problems.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the extent to which the, impact of
Chimel on the police bears out Mr. Justice Harlan's reservations, the points
raised by Mr. Justice White in his dissent merit discussion. lust as Mi. Justice
43 115 CONG. REc. S9566 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1969); see text accompanying note 3 supra.
44 The answer that will be raised to this point. is that decisions such as. Chimel protect the
rights of individuals in our twentieth-century society also. There remains; however, the question of whether the great majority of our citizens want their liberties protected- at the expense
of personal safety. Cons'ider the 'results of two Gallup polls taken in .1969.: In the first, released
in February of 1969, seventy-five percent of' those interviewed (whites and blacks alike) felt
that the courts did not treat criminals harshly enough. Only two percent felt that criminals
were treated too harshly by our courts. Denver Post, Feb. 18, 1969, at'20, col. 4. Further, in
June of 1969, another Gallup poll indicated that only thirty-three percent of the public gave
the United States Supreme Court a "favorable! rating (eight percent excellent, twenty-five
percent good), as opposed to a fifty-four percent "unfavorable" rating (thirtyrone percent fair,
twenty-three percent poor). Denver Post, June 15, 1969, at 18, col. 4. The. article by Dr.
Gallup analyzing this poll noted that:
An important factor behind the court's decline in public favor, as ,judged by the
views expressed in surveys, is the growing feeling that the court is, "too soft" on
criminals. Others complain that the rights of the individual, are being protected at the
expense of society as 'awhole. Id. at col. 3.
45 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 769 (1969).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Summer, 1970]

Frankfurter's dissent in Rabinowitz became one of the bases for Chimel, so may
Mr. Justice White's dissent become the basis for some future shift back to a more
flexible and realistic standard of arrest-based searches.
The dissent began with a brief review of the shifts in the law of arrest-based
searches, and the view was expressed that the Court should not now make the
fifth shift from Rabinowitz to the rigidity of the Chimel rule.' Justice White
then described the "reasonableness" test under the fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures; he emphasized: "The Court has
always held, and does not today deny, that when there is probable cause to search
and it is 'impracticable' for one reason or47 another to get a search warrant, then
a warrantless search may be reasonable."
Justice White then observed that it is unreasonable to require the police to
leave premises on which they have made a lawful arrest when there is great likelihood that confederates of the arrestee would dispose of evidence while a search
warrant is being sought."8 The Chimel case itself was cited as an example of
such a situation because in that case "it seem[ed] very likely that petitioner's wife,
who in view of petitioner's generally garrulous nature must have known of the
robbery, would have removed the coins."4 Mr. Justice White also expressed
strong reservations concerning the legality and the practicability of stationing
officers on the premises, against the will of parties not arrested, while a search
warrant is being procured5 0 This particular problem, one of the most acute
caused by Chimel, will be discussed later in detail.
Finally, the dissent took a generous approach to the right of search incident
to arrest. In Justice White's view, if the arrest was lawful 1 and there was probable cause for making the search, then "the police were not required to obtain a
search warrant in advance, even though they knew that the effect of the arrest
might well be to alert petitioner's wife that the coins had better be removed
52
soon."
The detectives in Chimel did have ample time and opportunity to secure a
search warrant prior to the arrest. Since they did not obtain the search warrant,
the majority ruled, the search beyond Chimel's immediate area of control was
illegal. Justices White and Black in the dissent would hold the search in Chimel
legal despite the fact that it was practicable for the officers to get a search warrant
prior to the arrest. The majority opinion, then, leaves open the question of what
the rule will be when it is clearly not practicable to procure a search warrant
prior to the arrest. The lack of guidelines in this area is one of the major problems
created for the police by the case, and it is to this problem that the model statute
or rule presented in the last section of this article addresses itself.
Mr. Justice White's dissent in Chimel illustrates one further point, for he
has climbed down from a lofty plane of constitutional theory and deals with the
46
47
48
49
50
51
White
52

Id. at 770.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 775 n.5.
Id. at 776. After a careful analysis of the law of arrest without warrants, Mr. Justice
concluded that Chimel's arrest was in fact lawful. Id. at 776-80.
Id. at 776.
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"gut problems" that confront the working policeman. Unlike the Chimel majority, Mr. Justice White is keenly aware of the myriad problems that law enforcement officers face in their day-to-day work. 3 Let us now consider some of these
problems.
II. Chimel v. California-ItsImpact on the Police
There are those who subscribe to the theory that the vindication of individual
rights through constitutional interpretation is the alpha and omega of our criminal
justice system, no matter how such interpretations hamper law enforcement
officers in their efforts to fight crime and to protect our society from its lawless
elements. This lofty attitude may be very attractive from the comfort and safety
of the bench, library, or classroom. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the police
are dealing with realities in their work, and the practical police problems raised
by Chimel cannot be lightly dismissed.
The criticism of the Chimel case explicit and implicit in this article may now
be put in its proper focus. As noted above, the right of courts to review the
conduct of the police is a fundamental and necessary part of our system of
justice, and lhis right is not questioned. The point is raised, however, that
reviewing courts ought at least consider the realities of the problems with which
the police are faced and, further, that the reviewing courts ought couch their
findings in terms sufficiently clear that the police may, with reasonable certainty,
know what course of conduct to follow in the future. Former Supreme Court
Justice Tom C. Clark, dissenting in Chapman v. United States, 4 summed up this
point:
Every moment of every day, somewhere in the United States, a law
enforcement officer is faced with a problem of search and seizure. He is
anxious to obey the rules that circumscribe his conduct in this field. It is the
duty of this Court to lay down those rules with such clarity and understanding that he may be able to follow them.55 (Emphasis added.) -

This language was addressed to the Supreme Court itself, and properly so,
for by the Court's own rulings, at least in the fourth amendment area,"8 its
decisions are binding on each and every court and each and every law enforcement officer in the United States. Thus a decision such as Chimel must control
the actions of literally tens of thousands of policemen, sheriffs, federal agents, and
other law enforcement officers throughout the nation. When the actions of these
officers result in arrests or searches and seizures, the hundreds of judges who sit at
all levels of our state and federal court systems must measure the actions by the
yardstick of the Supreme Court's pronouncements. Each of these judges is an
53 Ironically, this empathy for practical police problems is often shown in other opinions by
Mr. justice Stewart. For example, he dissented in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 439
(1969) and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 730 (1969). Both decisions were highly restrictive of police activity. Mr. Justice White was in the majority which decided Spinelli and Davis,
while Mr. Justice Black consistently dissented in Spinelli, Davis, and Chimel.
54 365 U.S. 610 (1961).

55 Id. at 622.
56 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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individual, of course, and each must make his own interpretations of what the
Court has mandated.57
Herein lies the criticism of Chimel from the point of view of the police. It is
submitted that the majority opinion in that case is so overbroad that: (1) the
most conscientious policeman, desiring to act properly, in many cases simply
cannot know whether his conduct is proper or not; and (2) any judge applying
Chimel to a given case has such latitude for interpretation that almost any arrestbased search could be held to be a Chimel violation if the sitting judge saw fit to
do so. This second result is of tremendous importance to the working policeman
in his decision-making process, for he must consider that certain judges will
interpret his conduct most strictly against him, no matter what the facts of the
case. Thus, the more latitude that there is in any Supreme Court decision for a
restrictive interpretation against the officer, the less certainty he can have that
his decision will not be second-guessed. The Chimel Court has made a sweeping
reversal of permissible police conduct and every officer in the country is bound
by the decision; yet the men who must apply the new standards in practice are
left in something of a legal limbo, for they do not know the extent to which
their conduct is circumscribed in the various situations that confront them on the
street.
Turning to specific problems created by Chimel, perhaps the best way to
begin would be to describe the immediate response of the law enforcement community to the decision when it was first handed down. This response, in the form
of a petition for rehearing in the case, constituted the first attempt to make known
to the Court the effects on police operations that its decision could have.
Responding State of California's petition for rehearing in the case deserves
scrutiny because it cogently presented to the Court an analysis of the problems for
law enforcement inherent in the Chimel decision. It is significant that respondent's
petition was joined in by the attorneys general of thirty-six states and territories.5 s
This clearly indicates very real concern over the effects of Chimel on the part of
chief law enforcement officers in more than two-thirds of the states.
The petition requested the Court to grant a rehearing, pointing out that the
United States Supreme Court59 and the supreme courts of the five most populous
states had in the past relied on Rabinowitz or Harris, the cases overruled by
57 For example, several courts have denied retroactivity to Chimel. United States v. Bennett, 415 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1969); Lyon v. United States, 416 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1969);
People v. Edwards, Cal. 2d
-, -,
458 P.2d 713, 720, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 '(1969) ;
Scott v. State, 7 Md. App. 505, -,
256 A.2d 384, 392 (1969). Other courts have applied
Chimel to cases pending on direct review on the date of the decision. Fresneda v. State, 458
P.2d 134, 143 & n.28 (Alas. 1969); State v. Reyes, 6 BNA CaRm. L. RPTR. 2220 (N.M. Dec. 1,
1969).
58 joining in the petition were Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the Territory of Guam. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 13-14, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's
Petition].
59 Id. at 2, citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Ker v. California, 374

U.S. 23, 42 (1963).

60 Respondent's Petition at 3. The petition cited cases from California, Illinois, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
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Chimel. It -then quoted the District Attorney of -Los Angeles County who estimated that as many as ninety percent of the cases scheduled for trial in that
county could be affected by Chimel.61 , Further, respondent's petition cited Mr.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Chimel, in -which he expressed reservations concerning the impact of the decision on local police.' Also noted was the
vast amount of paperwork that the expanded warrant system required by Chimel
would cause." ' '
One of the most telling points made by the petition dealt with the fact that
Chimel greatly restricts the ability of the police to secure that most reliable means
of proof, physical evidence.6 The petition noted:
In the context of the present ruling, there is indeed an ironic, if not
hollow, sound to the Court's recent pronouncements justifying new rules
restricting the obtaining of confessions on the theory that the police should
resort instead to other investigative skills and secure physical evidence of
the suspect's guilt ....
Finally, respondent's petition turned to the practical problems the decision
could cause for law enforcement and to the lack of 'guidelines for the police
to follow in dealing with the problems. 6 It listed some of the major areas of
concern:
What is the "reach" cof a suspect or "area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence"? . . . Does this area vary
with the physical build of the particular suspect or with his own mobility
and dexterity? Is an area which the suspect could reach in three or four
quick bounds within his "reach?" If the suspect is temporarily or, permanently incapable of "reaching," does this restrict the scope of the search
if the officer is aware, or should be aware, of this circumstance? If the
suspect is moving through the house, may the officers search those areas
which progressively come within his "reach?" If the suspect observes the
officers at a distance of 50 feet approaching to arrest him, what is his
"reach?" If he is placed in custody but makes an aborted attempt at escape,
may the area where he is again restrained be searched to preclude the
suspect from arming himself and destroying evidence? What if the moving
suspect is out of the officers' line of vision for a short period of time? How
does the Court's ruling affect 'the :doctrine that contraband in plain view
may be seized since no "search" is involved? May evidence which the
suspect seizes and throws beyond the ambit of his "reach" be seized? These
questions are not answered by the Court's opinion and promise to plague
trial courts and appellate courts with constant problems of definition and
distinctipn under the new rtle propounded by the Court. 7
The ten problem areas described by the petition are only a few examples of the
questions raised by the Chimel opinion--questions, it should be noted, that are of
such broad scope that there is much latitude in each of the areas for a court, so
61

Id. at,4.

62
63

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.

65
66

Id.
Id. at 9.

64 Id. at 7.

67 Id. at 9-10.
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inclined, to "second-guess" any officer's good faith attempt to comply with
Chimel.
Another question posed by respondent's petition concerns one of the most
critical problems raised by Chimel.
Assuming that the police effecting the arrest will already have sufficient
information to obtain a search warrant, or will acquire such by reason of
their observations at the time of the arrest (and this is decidedly not always
the case), one of the most troublesome problems presented is: May the
officers summon other officers to ensure that other persons present, or
expected, on the premises will not destroy or secret incriminating evidence
while a search warrant is being obtained? What if there are several persons
who are not arrested and who remain on the premises? Does this authorize
the police to station several officers on the premises and physically to restrain
each occupant any time the occupant approaches any evidence which might
readily be disposed of? As pointed out by the dissent [Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 775 n.5 (1969)], the invasion of the privacy of the other
occupants (who are perhaps innocent of any wrong doing) would be at least
as great as that resulting from a warrantless search of the premises incident
to the lawful arrest of the suspect.68
With regard to this problem it must be remembered that the respondent
was raising the question hypothetically, attempting to define for the Court problems that could arise. In the short period from June to October, 1969, before
the respondent's petition for rehearing was ruled upon, in one city, Denver,
Colorado, two cases actually did arise in which the hypothetical posed by the
petition became a very real problem for the police-a problem in which the application of the Chimel rule to two homicide investigations resulted in the frustration of police attempts to secure the murder weapon in each instance.
These two Denver cases led to the second response of law enforcement to
the Chimel case. The Denver police department, through the office of the
Attorney General of the State of Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief in support
of the State of California's petition for rehearing. This brief described the two
Denver homicide cases in which Chimel's broad mandate together with its lack
of guidelines frustrated searches for vital evidence.
The Denver police amicus brief did not ask the Court to reverse itself completely in the Chimel case, but only
to grant Respondent's Petition for Rehearing in the case of Chimel v.
Californiaso that an opportunity might be presented for spokesmen for law
enforcement, on every level, to make known to the Court the impact of this
decision on our function of protecting the safety of the people of this
country. Further, as a result of such rehearing the Court would have an
opportunity to consider the establishment of the guidelines in this area which
the police so desperately need. 9 (Footnote omitted,)
The brief itself was factual; the application of Chimel to the two Denver
68 Id. at 11.
69 Brief of the Attorney General of the State of Colorado and the Denver, Colorado, Police
Department, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 16, Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Denver Police Amicus Brief].
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homicide cases constituted the main thrust of the argument. The problem raised
by Chimel and common to each case was summarized in the brief as follows:
Police seeking a murder suspect learn of his whereabouts and arrest him in a
house. There was no time to get a search warrant for the murder weapon
and Chimel bars an arrest-based search of the house. Consent to search is
refused. During the period a warrant is being sought, friends and relatives
of the arrestee have every opportunity to remove the weapon, (or other
evidence) and the police are legally powerless to stop them. The subsequent
warrant-based search fails to discover the weapon, although
the facts
70
indicate the likelihood that the weapon was in fact present.
The two cases are classic examples of the manner in which an overbroad
opinion such as Chimel can place the police in a position where they cannot know
what actions are proper. In order to understand the problem in all of its aspects,
the details of the two cases presented in the Denver police amicus brief are
pertinent. The following, therefore, is an excerpt from that brief" presenting the
two cases.
CASE NUMBER ONE-HOMICIDE
DENVER,COLORADOOn July 7, 1969, the victim, a bartender, was shot to death in the
parking lot of his tavern by two youths whom he had chased off earlier for
prowling cars. The murder weapon was a .22 caliber automatic pistol.
Witnesses described the killers and their car; several days later, detectives learned that uniformed officers had stopped a similar car on the
night of the shooting and had taken the names and addresses of A and B,
the occupants of the car. Photographs of A and B, together with photographs of others, were shown to the witnesses who tentatively identified A
and B as the killers. This investigation was completed on July 12 and on
that date a pick-up for homicide was placed on A and B.
On the afternoon of July 12, Officers Haze and Mayes made inquiries
at the address that had been given by B. They learned that this was his
girl friend's house, and that B had not been seen in the neighborhood for
about a week. The officers then went to A's home and were told by A's
mother that he was not home; when apprised'of the seriousness of the
offense, however, A's mother produced him and he'was arrested at 6:00 p.m.
A told the officers that B was staying at his mother's house and A agreed
to take the officers to this house. Homicide Detectives Mullins and
McCormick responded to B's mother's house at about 6:20 p.m. B's mother
told the officers that B was not there, but Detective McCormick who had
gone to the side of the house arrested B in the side doorway as B was attempting to escape. A search of B's person was made revealing no weapons.
Because of the Chimel rule, no search was made of the room occupied by
B, or of any part of his mother's house, for the murder weapon or other
evidence. B's mother, his younger brother and several other people were in
the house at the time. Consent to search the house was asked for and refused.7 3 B was taken to Denver Police Headquarters where he was advised of
70 Id. at 4-5.
71 Id. at 5-10. Footnotes appearing in the brief have been renumbered, and some have been
omitted.
72 Both cases described have been filed by the Denver district attorney, but neither case has
come to trial. For this reason, the names of defendants are not published.
73 The possibility of watching the house while procuring a warrant was considered; but,
even if such a watch was set up, there would be no authority to search persons entering or
leaving the house.
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his rights
and denied any involvement with the killing.
Detective
Mullins called the Denver Police Department Attorney (Legal
Coordinator) who responded to Headquarters at about 7:00 p.m. to draft
search warrants for the murder weapon and clothes worn by the killers on
the night of the shooting. The Legal Coordinator advised that A and B
should be placed in line-ups so that a positive identification of the suspects
could be made by witnesses to support the search warrants.7 4 Line-ups were
held with counsel present for the suspects. A was not identified and was
released. B was positively identified by at least three witnesses'as one of the
assailants; however, by the time the line-ups were concluded, night had
fallen and the Colorado Rules5 of Criminal Procedure barred the execution
of a search warrant at night.

The next morning, Detectives McCormick, Martin, Burkhard and
Legal Coordinator Carrington procured search warrants for the houses of
B's mother and his girl friend seeking a .22 caliber automatic pistol, ammunition and the clothes worn by the killers. No evidence was found at the
girl friend's house.
When the warrant was executed at B's mother's house, the mother, B's
brother and a neighbor lady were present. The warrant was shown to B's
mother who made searching inquiries of the officers as to whether they were
sure that the murder weapon was an automatic. Upon being convinced that
only an automatic was being sought, B's mother nodded to the neighbor
lady who left and returned with a .22 caliber revolver wrapped in a "T"
shirt. The neighbor stated that B's mother had given her the revolver the
night before for "safe-keeping." The revolver was routinely checked but was
not the murder weapon. No other weapon was found.
The police in this case simply do not know whether the murder weapon
was at B's mother's house when B was arrested. A search of B's room and
other areas of the house under his control for the murder weapon would
have been permissible prior to Chimel as incident to B's arrest. Such a
search might have turned up the murder weapon, or it might not; however,
the officers, in obedience to Chimel's mandate, made no search. One thing
is certain; if, in fact, the weapon was in the house, B's mother and brother
had all night to search for and dispose of it. B's mother, understandably,
wanted to protect B, as shown by her lying to the police in stating that he
was not there when they came to arrest him, and by her giving the revolver
to the neighbor. It was only when she was sure that an automatic was being
sought that she had the neighbor produce the revolver. The police will
probably never know whether the weapon was in the house when B was
arrested; but, given B's mother's disposition to dispose of evidence they can
be sure that, if it was there, it was removed before the warrant-based search
was made.
CASE NUMBER TWO-HOMICIDE
DENVER, COLORADO
X, Y, and X's girl friend Z, along with several others, "crashed" a
party at a private home in the early morning of August 17, 1969. They
were told to leave and in leaving they exchanged words with other guests at
the party. X, Y, and Z went to X's car nearby and got a rifle out of the
trunk. A group of the party guests were standing outside of the house and
74 This decision was based on the tightening of search warrant requirements enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 '(1969).
75 Prior to the adoption of COLO. R. CRam. P. 41(c), effective October 1, 1969, the Colorado rules of criminal procedure provided that a search warrant could only be served at night
if the afflant was "positive" that the property sought was on the premises to be searched. Colo.
R. Crim. P. 41(c), 1 COLO. Rmv. STAT. AN. 279 (1963).
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a shot was fired at X's car, whereupon someone in X's car fired 8 shots into
the crowd killing the victim.
Detectives McCormick and Isenhart were assigned to investigate and
on the morning of August 17th questioned witnesses who identified photographs of Y as being in the group who crashed the party. At 11:00 a.m.
on the 17th, Y was arrested at his home by officers Duyker and Davin. Y
told officers that X had done the shooting and that X and Y had taken the
rifle into X's house. Y further told the officers that Z, X's girlfriend,
another suspect in the shooting, was living with X.
Y agreed to take the officer's [sic] to X's house. As the officers, Davin,
Duyker, and Secrist, approached, X apparently tried to escape by running
out of the back door but he was arrested as he ran around the house. Officers
entered the house and arrested Z inside the house. A search of Z's immediate area revealed no weapons. No further search was made.
Approximately ten persons were in the house at the time, including
X's brother, who became abusive and ordered the officers out of the house.
The officers left and called the detectives who procured a search warrant
to search the house for the rifle. It took approximately an hour and a half
to draft the warrant and find a judge to sign it. During this period, the
officers remained outside of the house; but they did not stop or search any
persons leaving the house. When the house was searched pursuant to the
warrant, the rifle was gone.
THE DEFENDANT, X, TOLD THE POLICE THAT WHEN HE
WAS ARRESTED, THE RIFLE WAS IN THE HOUSE. The conclusion
is inescapable; while the police waited for the search warrant, one of X's
friends removed the murder weapon. A pre-Chimel search for the weapon
incident to Z's arrest in the house would doubtless have located the weapon;
but the officers knowing that the Chimel rule would make the weapon inforced to take no action to secure this vital evidence until
admissible, were
76
it was too late.
These two cases are not unique to Denver, nor is the problem confined
to homicides; in many minor crimes the impact of the Chimel rule has also
been felt.7 7 The two described cases illustrate that, despite the gravity of the
offense and the really excellent police work involved in each case, Chimel can
frustrate the best efforts of the officers.
An analysis of these two strikingly similar cases leads to three conclusions.
First, in the Chimel case itself the police admittedly had time to procure a
search warrant. In the Denver cases there was dearly no time to procure search
warrants for the houses of X and B because in each case, the police had arrested
one of two murder suspects and there had been witnesses to the arrests of the
first suspects. Thus, there was every probability that the word of these arrests
would be relayed to the second suspects enabling the latter to flee. (As a matter
of fact, both X and B did attempt to flee as the officers approached.) As the
Denver police amicus brief pointed out, when the police learn of the whereabouts
of potentially armed and dangerous criminals, delay for a period of hours or
76 Participating officers were asked why they did not keep the persons in the house or
search them when they left. They each answered that they felt that they had no legal authority
to do either, and they feared civil suits for false arrest or "civil rights violations."
77 For example, half an hour after the theft occurred, an officer entered a house to arrest
a defendant for the theft of some liquor. Defendant and his parents were sitting in the kitchen.
After defendant's arrest, the officer found the liquor in the refrigerator. The officer had to
be told that his search was illegal under the Chime! rule, despite the likelihood that the parents
would have disposed of the liquor.
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even days while a search warrant is being procured is a luxury that the police
cannot afford. The police have an overriding duty to the public to take such
suspects into custody and to seize their weapons before they commit further
crimes. It is submitted that it is not too much to ask that any reviewer of police
conduct take cognizance of the fact that many cases require swift action on the
part of the police, and that delay by the police in such cases would constitute a
serious dereliction of duty."'
Second, once officers have made their entry to arrest, they are committed;
all surprise is lost, and other persons on the premises are made aware that the
suspect has been arrested. In both of the Denver cases friends and/or family of
the arrestees were on the premises, consent to search was refused, and there was
every probability that an attempt would be made to dispose of evidence. The
officers clearly had probable cause to search for the murder weapon on the
premises, but the broad language of Chimel could be construed to bar a warrantless, arrest-based search of the houses. Thus, the officers in the Denver cases had
two options at this point. They could either search for the murder weapon and
risk losing it legally if a court should construe Chimel broadly enough to cover
the case; despite the exigencies of the circumstances; or they could take the
"safe" course, waiting for the procurement of a search warrant but risking loss
of the weapon physically through the agency of the friends or family of the
arrestee.
Third, if the police elect the "safe" course and wait for a search warrant, as
did the Denver police officers, they are then faced squarely with the problem of
securing the premises in such a way that the evidence will not be disposed of.
The Denver police amicus brief discussed the alternatives open to the police.
A. May the police remain on the premises, prevent the persons there from
leaving, and follow them from room to room?
The Chimel majority decision certainly gives the police no authority
for so doing, and Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, points out that
such a course of conduct on the part of the officers would constitute an
invasion which "would be almost as great as that accompanying an unlawful
search." [Chimel v. California,395 U.S. 752, 775 n.5 (1969).]
Detaining persons, inside the house, for whom there is no probable
cause to arrest could easily result in a civil suit against the officers for false
arrest or false imprisonment; and the authority of officers to remain on the
premises against the will of an owner or co-occupant is questionable at
best. Thus, in addition to risking possible civil liability, the officers might
find a court excluding even the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant because the officers exceeded their authority by remaining on the
premises while the search warrant was being procured.
B. May the officers leave the house itself but position themselves
just outside the house; and, until the search warrant arrives, search persons
leaving the house for the murder weapons or other evidence?
Again, there is no authority in the Chimel opinion for such a search,
and, in the absence of probable cause to arrest a person, such a search
would almost certainly be held illegal. Even a "frisk" for weapons on less
than probable cause to arrest, under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) would be doubtful since that case is expressly tied to the
78

See Denver Police Amicus Brief at 10-11.
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necessity of the protection of the officer rather than a search for evidence.
Again, the risk of a civil suit in battery or assault against an officer making
such a search is apparent; as a matter of fact, a person searched-by an
officer as he was leaving the suspect house might even claim that an assault
on the officer was justified as validly resisting an unlawful search.
C. The police, then, as a final alternative, may leave the premises,
search no one leaving the premises and wait for the search warrant to be
procured. This is exactly what was done in the two cases described. In one
of the cases, it is known that the murder weapon was removed by friends of
the defendants while the police waited for the warrant. In the other case,
it is known that the defendant's mother removed at least one weapon from
the house in the overnight period that it took to secure a valid search warrant; whether the murder weapon itself was removed will probably never
be known79
It is obvious that in the Denver cases the police "guessed wrong." The point
to be made is that in cases as serious as the two described the police should not
have to guess at all. Surely, guidelines dealing with such cases (where the police
are acting under exigent circumstances or where they are faced with an imminent loss of vital evidence) could have been spelled out in the Chimel opinion,
yet this was not done.
In the Denver cases Chimel carved out a constitutional "zone of immunity"
for those who would accommodate a friend or relative by disposing of incriminating evidence, and this is so despite the best efforts of the police to act in a
proper manner. *The "zone of, immunity""0 rendered the procurement of a
search warrant a futile gesture.
I The Denver police amicus brief ended 'with a plea to the Court for police
guidelines so that cases such as those, described need not happen again."' But
the Court denied rehearing in Chimel without opinion."3
These, then, were the original responses of law enforcement to Chimel:
respondent's petition for rehearing (joined by thirty-six attorneys general) and
the Denver police amicus brief. As far as accomplishing their main purpose,
that of persuading the Court to rehear Chimel, the attempts were obviously
fruitless. But law enforcement response had another, salutary, if somewhat
unexpected, result. On October 23, 1969, Senator McClellan addressed the
Senate about Chimel v. California and its impact on police work. Of Chimel
he said:
Mr. President, most recently, it has come to my attention that local law
enforcement is now beginning to feel the ill effects of the recent Supreme
Court decision of Chimel v. California-395 U.S. 752 (1969)-which, in
line with the Court's recent tradition of handing down decisions seriously
weakening law enforcement's ability to combat crime, further hamstrings
law enforcement by greatly curtailing the right of police officers to make
searches of premises incident to a lawful arrest.8 3
79
80
81
82
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Id. at 12-13.
See text accompanying notes 122-24 infra.
Denver Police Amicus Brief at 16.
Chinel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, rehearing,denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
115 CoNG. REc. S13131 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1969).
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Senator McClellan referred specifically to respondent's petition for rehearing
in Chimel and to the Denver police amicus brief. Of the two Denver homicide
cases he said: "These two examples graphically show how our law enforcement

officers are increasingly being restricted by court-imposed special rules of criminal procedure. They give flesh and bones to the antiseptic statistics I noted
8

above." "

He then read the Denver police amicus brief into the Congressional Record

in almost its entirety. 5 As was noted above, Senator McClellan may be the
single most important figure in the country in combating crime in an :effective
and constructive manner. His interest in the problems created by Chimel may
bode well for future legislation, at least on the federal level, dealing with Chimelcreated problems.
The two Denver homicide cases are excellent examples of the dilemma that
can face a policeman called on to make important decisions in the absence of
adequate guidelines. Since the problems that Chimel raises are, in large mesure,
caused by this lack of guidelines, let us turn to the majority opinion in order to
ascertain what, if any, guidelines are given. Here the writer asks that the reader
consider, the subject on a practical rather than a theoretical plane. Place yourself,
if you will, in the position of the working policeman who desires to act in a professional and constitutional manner. What does the Chimel opinion say to him?
First, Chimel tells the officer that he may search the person of the arrestee for
weapons and for destructible evidence.8 6 Further, it is permissible for the arresting
officer to search the "immediate area" of the arrestee-that area from which he
might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence.8 " As California's petition for
rehearing pointed out,88 this language raises myriad'problems of interpretation;
but the paragraph in the Chimel opinion that tells the officer what he may not
do is the one that really leaves the officer floundering:
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any
room other than that in which the arrest occurs--or, for that matter, for
searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions,
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.8 9 (Footnote
omitted.)
On these words must depend the arrest-based search decisions of every police
officer in the country.

We see, then, an almost blanket prohibition on arrest-based searches outside
of the arrestee's "immediate area," the definition of which opens the door to the
widest possible variation in judicial interpretations.
Hopefully, reviewing courts dealing with the "reach" question will take as
realistic a point of view as did the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in the
case of Scott v. State." In that case the Maryland court enunciated what may
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
Id. at S13132-33.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
Id.
Respondent's Petition at 9-12.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
7 Md. App. 505, 256 A.2d 384 (1969).
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be called the "lunge" doctrine-that is, the permissible scope of an arrest-based
search extends beyond- mere arm's length into that area into which the suspect
could lunge, leap, or dive-in'crder to gain control of a weapon or destructible
evidence. 9 This eminently realistic holding indicates that the Maryland court
was concerned with the practical application of the Chimel rule to the actualities
of police work. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing whether other reviewing courts will take such a generous view of police problems. Certainly if a court
wished to confine the Chimel-limited search to a strict "arm's length" area, the
majority opinion is vague enough to sustain such a restrictive interpretation.
In addition to the lack of guidelines concerning the "reach" question,
Chimel does not adequately specify when its iule applies. What exceptions exist
to the rigors of the Chimel mandate? The majority opinion states that search
warrants are required "in the absence of well-recognized exceptions."9" Here
was an opportunity for the opinion to set forth clearly those exceptional situations
in which searches beyond the immediate area of the arrestee might lawfully be
made; instead the sentence on exceptions is merely footnoted.
The footnote9 may well become one of the most construed in the history
of Supreme Court -jurisprudence, for it is the only clue to what Mr. Justice
Stewart may have had in mind when he spoke of "well-recognized exceptions."
The footnote says: "See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347; 357-358."
Our guideline-seeking officer now turns to the cited pages in Katz; what
does he find? He learns, first, that Katz is an eavesdropping case rather than a
case dealing with arrest-based searches. 4 In Katz, which was also written by
Mr. Justice Stewart, the Court held that the fourth amendment requires the
suppression of evidence obtained by the use of an eavesdropping device placed
on top of a public telephone booth by FBI agents without a search warrant.
The "trespass" theory," which required an actual physical invasion to make
warrantless eavesdropping illegal, was overruled by Katz.
The Chimel footnote refers to pages 357 and 358 of the Katz opinion. On
these pages in Katz our officer finds language discussing the hot pursuit and
consent search exceptions to the warrant requirement, but the opinion merely
states that these exceptions do not apply to eavesdropping cases. The only other
language of apparent significance in the text of that part of the Katz opinion
states that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' The italicized language is again footnoted: "S6e, e.g., Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 454-456; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-177; Cooper v.
California,386 U.S. 58; Warden V'. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300.""9 Thus, in a
91 Id. at -,
256 A.2d at 389.
92 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
93 Id. at n.8.
94 The opinion states: "We do not deal in this case with the law of detention or arrest
under the Fourth Amendment." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 n.13 (1967).
95 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942).
96 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
97 Id. at n.19.
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footnote to a footnote we finally encounter "guidelines" dealing with exceptions
to the search warrant requirement and, therefore, to the Chimel rule. Of the
five cases cited in the Katz footnote, three, Carroll, Cooper, and Brinegar, are
concerned with the searches of automobiles. Warden v. Hayden deals with the
permissible scope of a warrantless, arrest-based search of premises when officers
are in "hot pursuit," and McDonald defines "exigent circumstances" as an exception to the warrant requirement for searching premises. Both Warden v.
Hayden and McDonald are extremely important cases in search and seizure law
and will be discussed in detail later. It is submitted, however, that by no stretch
of the imagination can a footnoted reference to a footnote in another case be
considered guidelines for a police officer who is desirous of clear instructions
as to what actions he can or cannot lawfully take.
We turn now to specific areas of police work in which the combination of
the Chimel-created restrictions on searches, together with the Court's failure
to furnish guidelines for proper police action, has hampered or predictably will
hamper the effectiveness of law enforcement. The first of these problem areas
is perhaps the most critical from the point of view of the officer himself.
A.

Chimel and the Safety of the Officer

Mr. Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion in Chimel, paid lip
service to the safety of police officers by stating that searches of persons may be
made incident to an arrest: "Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered and the arrest itself frustrated.""8 In enunciating the "reach" doctrine
of the case, Mr. Justice Stewart again mentioned the protection of the officer:
"A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested."99 But here the majority's concern for the officer apparently ends, for
the next paragraph in the opinion prohibits searches of other rooms or even
closed compartments in the room in which the arrest took place. The majority
seems to be of the opinion that only the arrestee himself could be dangerous;
the possibility that others on the premises could pose a threat to the officer
is ignored.
Consider the following hypothetical cases:
Example # 1. Officers respond to a call that a man in a certain
apartment has been threatening his neighbors with a pistol. The officers
enter the apartment to find the man alone and in a highly agitated state.
At this point, the primary concern of the officers will be to secure the
pistol before it can be used against them or others, and this is true no
matter where the fortuitous circumstances of the case dictate that the
actual arrest take place.
While one of the officers is trying to deal with the highly disturbed
suspect, his partner secures the weapon from a drawer in a desk across
98
99

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
Id.
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the room. In this case the police have acted to protect themselves and
others from harm; but, by so doinghave they violated the Chimel rule
so -that the gun, necessary evidence. if the man should be prosecuted
for threatening the neighbors, must be suppressed?
Example # 2. Two officers receive a reliable tip that Jones, wanted
for a murder by shooting, may be found at his brother's house. The
officers are 'also advised by the informant that Jones may leave at any
time. There is clearly no time to procure a search warrant, 'so the officers
proceed at once to the brother's house. Upon entering- they find Jones
on the living room sofa. They arrest him and handcuff him; a search
of the sofa reveals nothing. :
The brother enters the room and, becoming highly abusive, starts
towards a desk across the room from where Jones was arrested. There is
not an experienced police officer in this country who would not check the
desk before the brother could get to it to see if it contained a weapon;
yet suppose that the desk does contain a gun and that the gun in the
desk is the one used by'Jones in the murder. Must the gun be suppressed
in Jones's murder trial as the product of an unlawful search under
the Chimel rule?
Both of the above' examples illustrate a fairly common -police problem
encountered where an officer has a reasonable fear that weapons may be concealed on premises where an arrest has taken place. With the broad language
of Chimel now governing the 6fficer's conduct, the officer is faced with a disturbing dilemma. If he acts to preserve his safety, he may be acting at the peril
of his case, for any, weapon that he finds might be ruled inadmissible because
the scope of his "search" ranged too far beyond the arrestee's "reach."
Under a broad interpretation of Chimel, there may even be a question
as to whether officers can look in rooms other than that in which the arrest took
place. Consider this in the context of an actual incident that took place during
a raid in Dade County, Florida:100
Example # 3. The case involved a post-Chimel arrest of a dope
peddler in his home. The suspect's mother and sister, who had no love
for the police, were also present. The sister stated that she had to go to
the bathroom and started into another room. Fortunately, an alert officer followed her in time to seize a fully loaded 9mm automatic from
the top of a dresser in a bedroom that the sister had entered. The Dade
County officers are frankly uncertain whether the sister would have
taken up the gun or not; the point is that the gun was there and had
she not been followed the officers might have found themselves looking
down the barrel of an automatic.,
In cases like these it is entirely reasonable for an officer to, search more
100 Details of this incident were related to the author by members of the Dade County
Public Safety Department's Police Legal Unit who actually took part in the raid described.
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,than an arrestee's "immediate area" to make sure that there are no weapons
present; nevertheless, the lack of any guidelines in, Chimel covering this situation
leaves the officer's reasonable cohlduct subject to second.guessing by ,reviewing
courts.
Certain courts are deeply concerned with the officer's safety. For example,
in a post-Chimel case, State v. Moody, 1 ' the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
,a traffic-arrest-based search of an automobile for weapons, stating: "We believe
that police officers, while in the performance of their official duties, are entitled
to all the safety and protection we can give them within constifutional limitations."'0 2 The police have every reason to be gratful to the Missouri Supreme
,Court for taking this realistic attitude towards the dangers of police work.
Whether other reviewing courts will take such a generous point of view cannot
be known; but in light of the Chimel opinion, such an-approach would be at
best uncetain in many courts.
B.

Chimel and the Riot Situation

Riots and civil disorders have become an item of acute law enforcement
concern in this country, and the police are the ones who must deal with these
situations. When a police force is committed to the street during the height
of a riot, there will be little opportunity for them to delay their investigations
-in'6rder torocure search warrants. The police will, of necessity, be-acting
.under extreme stress and will have to make search and seizure decisions under
pressures that will be impossible to re-createT-in -the serenity of a courtroom
-rfonths later when the officer's actions are reviewed.
This may be illustrated by. the following-hypothetical:

*'

Example # 4.. Officers are in a riot, situation and, are under fire on
the street; they observe shots coming from a certain apartment window
and storm the apartment. Upon entry, they find the kniper -an&"his rifle
in the room from which the shots emaniated. There is no quesfioi that
the officers will, at this point, fan out through the apartment in search
of other snipers and other weapons.
Suppose that the officers find no other persons present, but they
do find a cache-of arms and ammunition concealed-in a closet in another
room in the "sniper's apartment. Mist' this evidence be suppressed at a
subsequent trial of the sniper or other' conspirators because the search
admittedly ranged far beyond the' sniper's reach?

Many theories can be advanced: to sustain this search. Chimel proscribes
officer's "routinely" searching other rooms without a warrant ' and the circumstances in the example are far from routine. In addition; with the officers
101
.102
103

443 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1969).
Id. at804.
Chinel v. Califoria, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

.

-
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in "hot pursuit" of the sniper, a search of the apartment could be upheld under
the authority of Warden v. Hayden," in which the Supreme Court sustained
the warrantless search of an entire house when the officers entered "within
minutes" of the suspect's entry. Finally, McDonald v. United States..5 could be
cited to justify the warrantless search as having been made under "exigent
circumstances."
It is highly likely that most courts would, in fact, uphold the search described in the foregoing example. But it must be remembered that certain
courts consistently rule that cases must be resolved most strictly against the
police, and such a court could find ample authority in the broad language of
Chimel to suppress the evidence.
This is exactly the position taken by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in the case of Leven v. United States.' During the April, 1968, riots
in Washington, D.C., .officers arrested Leven for a curfew violation while Leven
was driving a truck through the city with a shotgun prominently displayed. The
officers followed Leven to the police station, where Leven parked the truck and
went inside. One of the officers, who had observed Leven place something
under the front seat, looked there and found two revolvers after Leven went
into the police station.
The District of Columbia court ruled that the revolvers must be suppressed
since Leven had left the truck, citing Preston v. United States. The fact that
the arrest occurred during a riot situation was completely disregarded by the
majority in Leven. Chief Judge Hood, dissenting, said:
Under these circumstances, I think it is most unreasonable and unrealistic to say that the officer, at a time when there was a great shortage

of police manpower, should have0 7gone across the city seeking a judicial
officer to issue a search warrant.

The Leven case clearly illustrates the absolute lack of concern for the realities of police problems shown by some courts. Such a court would undoubtedly
suppress weapons found in a situation such as is described in the hypothetical
Example # 4 above.
As a further illustration of the fact that certain judges remain oblivious to
any exigencies of a situation, consider the case of the murder of a Detroit policeman and the attempted murder of another that occurred in March of 1969."'8
At about 11:42 P.m. on March 29, 1969, patrolmen Michael Czapski and
Richard Worobec of the Detroit police department reported that there were
104

387 U. S. 294 (1967).

105

335 U. S. 451 (1948).

106 6 BNA CRIM. L.
107 Id. at 2353.

RPTR.

2352 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 1970).

108 This account of the Detroit incident is based on accounts appearing in the Detroit newspapers at the time of the shooting, Detroit News, Apr. 1, 1969, at 5-C, 13-A, on the testimony
of Lt. William R. McCoy, Special Investigations Bureau, Detroit Police Department, before the
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Hearings on Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 20,
at 4368-70 (1969), and on the Detroit police account of the incident that appeared in the
Detroit newspapers- shortly after the incident in the form of a full page advertisement paid for
by the Detroit Police Officers Association. Detroit News, Apr. 15, 1969. at 13-A.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Sulmmer, 1970]

men with rifles at Linwood and Euclid streets in Detroit. When the two officers
left their car to investigate, the men opened fire, killing officer Czapski and
seriously wounding officer Worobec. According to the Detroit police, the assailants ran directly into New Bethel Baptist Church at 8450 Linwood, which had
been rented for a meeting of the Republic of New Africa, a militant black
organization. The police officers responding to the scene of the killing were fired
upon from the church and were again fired upon when they forced entry into
the church.
One hundred fifty-two persons in the church were arrested and taken to
police stations for identification and nitrate tests to determine if they had recently
fired weapons. All but two of those arrested were freed by Detroit Recorder's
Court Judge George W. Crockett on the grounds that the police had violated
their rights by arresting them and subjecting them to scientific tests.
Here we have an incident in which one policeman was killed, a second
wounded, and others subjected to fire from the church, yet one judge released
almost all of the potential suspects. It is submitted that such an attitude towards
the police by a reviewing court could result in the application of Chimel to riot
situations despite the exigencies of the circumstances. Further, the lack of guidelines covering such situations in the Chimel opinion does little to prevent such
an unrealistic interpretation.
C.

Chimel Coupled with Other Search
and Seizure Restrictions

1. Chimel and Spinelli.
The holding in Chimel that, henceforth, almost all searches of premises
must be made with warrants cannot be taken in a vacuum. Rather, the Court's
prior pronouncements regarding search warrants must now be considered.
Until 1969 the Court had followed a fairly liberal "rule of reason" with
regard to the requirements for a valid search warrant. In United States v.
Ventresca °9 in 1965, the Court had stated:
If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved
here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in
the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements
of elaborate specificity, once exacted under common law pleadings have
no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing
courts towards warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to judicial officers before acting."'0 (Emphasis added.)
In March of 1969, four months before Chimel was decided, the Court
decided Spinelli v.United States"' and exhibited that very "grudging and nega109

380 U.S. 102 (1965).

110
111

Id. at 108.
393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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tive" attitude towards search warrants that Ventresca had cautioned against.
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing the majority opinion in Spinelli,"2 literally picked
to pieces the affidavit for a search warrant in an FBI gambling case; he found
it to be defective.
The affidavit in Spinelli was based on a reliable informant's tip that Spinelli
was accepting bets over two telephone numbers identified by the informant.
FBI surveillance, recited the affidavit, had placed Spinelli in the apartment where
the telephones identified by the informant were located, and the affiant FBI
agent stated that Spinelli was known to him to be a bookmaker and gambler."1
In dissecting the Spinelli affidavit, Mr. Justice Harlan first found the informant's tip insufficient to meet the test of Aguilar v. Texas. 4 for informantbased search warrants. Aguilar requires that, in order to establish probable
cause, an affidavit based on information from an infoftnant must show (1) why
the informant is to be considered reliable and (2) how the informant knows
that that property to be searched for is located where he says it is. The affidavit
in Spinelli brought out neither of these points, but it was argued that the FBI
surveillance corroborated the informant's tip sufficiently to establish probable
cause. Mr. Justice Harlan rejected this, saying that Spinelli's entrance into the
apartment was not sufficient corroboration. The FBI agent's statement that
Spinelli was known to him as a gambler and bookmaker was dismissed as mere
police suspicion.
Mr. Justice Fortas, dissenting in Spinelli, said:
In the present case, as I view it, the affidavit showed not only relevant surveillance, entitled to some probative weight for purposes of the issuance of
a search warrant, but also additional specific facts of significance and
adequate reliability: that Spinelli was using two telephone numbers, identified by an "informant" as being used for bookmaking, in his illegal operations; that these telephones were in an identified apartment; and that
Spinelli, a known bookmaker, frequented the apartment. Certainly, this
is enough."

5

(Footnote omitted.)

In the Spinelli-Chimel combination we have a truly ironic situation. Spinelli
is an extremely restrictive decision on the validity of search warrants with which
Mr. Justice Stewart, a dissenter in Spinelli, did not agree. But four months
later Mr. Justice Stewart expanded the warrant requirement out of all proportion. Thus, Mr. Justice Stewart in Chimel requires the police to operate under
a warrant system governed by the Spinelli restrictions in which he did not concur.
To complete the irony, Mr. Justice Harlan, in Chimel, expressed concern over
"the extent to which cities and towns across the Nation are prepared to administer the greatly expanded warrant system which will be required by today's
decision ..... ,,6 Certainly the administration of the warrant, system required by
112 The majority consisted of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Douglas, Harlan,
and White. Justices Black, Stewart, and Fortas dissented, while Mr. Justice Marshall took no
part in the decision.
113 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 420 (1969).
114 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
115 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 420 (1969).
116 Chimel v. Clalifornia, 395 U.S. 752, 769 (1969).
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Chimel will not be aided by the extremely restrictive view of search warrants that
Mr. Justice Harlan expressed in Spinelli."7
A case that occurred in Denver will illustrate how the Spinelli-Chimel combination can work in practice:
Example # 5. Certain minibikes had been stolen in Denver. A confidential informant of established reliability had located the minibikes in
suspect X's basement. To his knowledge, the infonnant was the only
person besides X who had been in X's basement and had seen the
minibikes.'
Chimel barred the police from arresting the suspect in his home and
making an arrest-based search for the minibikes;118 and the requirement
of Spinelli that an affidavit for search warrant state how the informant
knows the property is on the premises to be searched precluded the use
of a search warrant. This was so because, obviously, if th affidavit stated
that the informant had seen the minibikes in X's basement, X would
know who the informant was, even though the affidavit did not identify
the informant by name.
Under these circumstances the police came to the conclusion that
a valid search warrant meeting the Spinelli test could not be drawn
without identifying the informant by implication. No rifinibikes are
worth risking the life or safety of an informant; consequently no search
was made and the bikes were not recovered." 9
One might ask whether this is really important. After all, what are a
few minibikes? The case, nevertheless, is important, for here again we see a
constitutional "zone of immunity" protecting the items from seizure and the
suspect from arrest because of the combination of circumstances with two extremely restrictive holdings by the Court.
The fourth amendment ought not be used to shield the guilty from police
action. It is highly unlikely that the founding fathers who drafted the amendment desired this end, yet the Court's interpretations have created such a situation. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Davis v. Mississippi,2 ' noted that:
This case is but one more in an ever-expanding list of cases in which this
Court has been so widely blowing up the Fourth Amendment's scope that
its original authors' would be hard put to recognize their creation.' 21
(Footnote omitted.)
117 See generally Singer, Filpi & Race, The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment,
October, 1968, Term, 60 J. CGaz. L.C. & P.S. 493 (1969).
118 The arrest of the suspect based on the reliable informant's tip would have been justified
under McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), which held that information from an informant
of demonstrated reliability may be the basis for arrest. McCray also stands for the proposition
that an informant who merely furnishes the police with probable cause for arrest need not-be
identified.
119 One might ask why the police did not simply place X's house under surveillance. With
street crime skyrocketing, few police departments can now spare the men needed for the long
periods of surveillance required in a case such as this where there was no way of knowing when
the suspect might bring one of the bikes out of his house.
120 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
121 Id. at 729.
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2. Chimel and the "Night Search.WarrantRule.?Under the rules of procedure in certain states, e.g., Arizona 22 and Colorado 28 (prior to October of 1969), and under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,' 24 it is required that for a search warraht to be served at night the
affiant must be "positive" that the property to ,be. sought is on the premises
to be searched. This requirement, coupled with Chimes limitation of arrestbased searches, can result in further "zones of immunity" protecting certain
violators despite the best efforts of the police.- Another case from Denver will
illustrate this:
Example # 6. Colorado rules of criminal procedure required a
"positive" affidavit for a nighttime search warrant until October 1, 1969,
when the Supreme Court of Colorado discarded this provision. In a
Denver case that arose after Chimel was decided but before October first,
.officers had received information from a confidential informant, whose
information had resulted in numerous seizures in the past; that a marijuana party was taking place in Denver.
To obtain a nighttime search warrant for the house in which the
party was taking place, however, the police felt, based on past cases,
that in order to have a valid "positive" affidavit for a nighttime search
the affidavit must show that the informant had been in the house within
a few hours of the time that the warrant was sought. Since there was
only a small number of persons at the party, the positive affidavit, pinpointing the time when the informant was present, would have permitted
the violators to identify the informant by process of elimination.
The doctrine of McCray v. Illinois25 would protect the identity
of the informant from actual disclosure by the police; yet, as in Example
# 5, the use of a search warrant in the circumstances of the particular
case would allow the identity of the informant to be deduced by the
violators. There was a very real danger to the informant in this case
if his identity had become known; as a result, the police were forced
to forego any search due to Chimel's prohibition of an arrest-based
search superimposed on the "night search warrant rule." By morning
all evidence had been consumed.
Again, search and seizure restrictions forced the police to sit by and do
nothing, despite relatively certain knowledge of a violation. The case just described was cited to the Colorado Supreme Court by the Denver police department and the Denver district attorney's office as a practical argument in favor of
doing away with the "night search warrant rule" in Colorado. The Colorado
court took a realistic attitude towards the problem and did, in fact, ,remove the
positive requirement from the Colorado rules of criminal procedure. 2 But such
122
123
124
125
126

ARmZ. R v. STAT. ANN. § 13-1447 (1956).

Colo. R. Crim. P. 41'(c), 1 CoLo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. 279 (1963).
Fzi. R. Cems. P. 41(c).
386 U.S. 300 (1967); see, note 118 supra.,See note 75 supra.
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a rule is still in force in other jurisdictions where problems such as the Denver
case could easily arise. The above example further illustrates the total disregard
for practical police problems evidenced by the majority opinion in Chimel;
nowhere in that opinion is the slightest consideration given to the possibility that
the expanded warrant system would become doubly cumbersome under such
local restrictions.
3. Local Restrictions on the Seizure of Certain Items.
Consider the case in which a local search warrant statute does not provide
for the seizure of certain classes of items. A hypothetical example will illustrate:
Example # 7. The Arizona statute concerning search warrants does
not authorize a warrant to issue for mere evidence.'
Suppose that the
police go to the house of a rape-murder suspect and arrest him in the
doorway. There are no items of evidence found on his person, and
Chimel prohibits an arrest-based search ranging farther than his "immediate area." Now, suppose further that the police have information that
the suspect's bloody underclothes are concealed in the house. The underclothes constitute items of mere evidence so that a search warrant could
not issue for them in a jurisdiction such as Arizona. Seizure incident to
the arrest is foreclosed by Chimel so that assuming that a consent search
is refused, the "zone of immunity" surrounding a piece of highly probative evidence is complete. Despite the existence of probable cause, the
police would be unable to make a constitutional seizure of such evidence.
The foregoing example is not farfetched when one considers the extremely
grudging attitudes taken towards search warrants by some lower courts. Illustrative of just such an attitude is the post-Chimel case of State v. Paul," decided
by the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in which Chimel is interpreted most
strictly against the police. In Paul the court suppressed items of evidence of a
burglary discovered and seized in the course of a lawful search made pursuant
to a search warrant. The court ordered the items suppressed because these specific items were not named in the search warrant, although they were connected
with the burglary for which the warrant issued. The court apparently felt that
since Chimel overruled Harris v. United States"9 with regard to the permissible
scope of an arrest-based search, it also overruled that part of Harris that had
been construed as permitting the seizure of incriminating items discovered in the
course of a lawful search made with a warrant, even though such items were not
named in the warrant.3
The question of the seizure of items not named in a search warrant is not
discussed in Chimel; and Chimel expressly overruled Harris (and Rabinowitz)
127 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1442 (1956).
128 80 N.M. 521, 458 P.2d 596 (1969).
129 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
130 The court stated: "We do not attempt to define the effects of Chimel upon Harris.
Because of Chimet, however, we do not consider Harris as authority for the seizure of items
not named in the warrant." State v. Paul. 80 N.M. 521. -,
458 P.2d 596, 600 (1969).
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only "insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with those we have
endorsed today." ' ' Thus, the New Mexico court has gone much farther than
the United States Supreme Court in restricting police activity and has created
a restriction on search warrants that has certainly not been mandated by
2
Chimel"'
D. Chimel and the Unavailability of an Issuing Magistrate
In certain areas of this country the police are faced with a situation where
there may be no magistrate available to issue a search warrant at a given time.
This is particularly true in rural areas and in the less populous states, as indicated in a statement by James E. Barrett, Attorney General of the State of
Wyoming:
I was further very interested in the observation made in [the Chime brief
with respect to the impact of Chimel on rural police departments where
the number of persons authorized to issue search warrants is limited. It is
already a fact of life in many of the small counties of Wyoming that it is
impossible to secure the services of a Justice of the Peace in1 3the dead of
night for the purpose of either an arrest or a search warrant.
The unavailability of a magistrate can result in delays of hours or days
while a search warrant is being procured--delays allowing evidence to be consumed, removed, or destroyed. The following is an actual case from Aspen,
Colorado.
Example # 8. Aspen is a small resort town in the Colorado high
country. One county judge lives in Aspen and is the only person in town
empowered to issue warrants. The next nearest magistrate is in Glenwood
Springs, about fifty miles from Aspen; but when the mountain roads are
snow covered the round trip may take a matter of hours. During particularly heavy snowfalls the road may be impassable.
On the occasion in question the police had received information
from a person of proven reliability that a group of young people were
engaged in the use of drugs in a certain residence in Aspen. A search
131

395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).

132

The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court concerning the seizure of items

not named in a search warrant came in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 559 (1969), in a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart joined by Justices Brennan and White. Stanley reversed
the conviction of a Georgia man convicted of having obscene films in his own home, the
reversal being predicated on first amendment grounds. Mr. Justice Stewart would have reversed on fourth amendment grounds because the films were, in his opinion, unlawfully
seized. The films were discovered during the course of a warrant-based search for gambling
paraphernalia and were not named in the warrant. The key to Mr. Justice Stewart's argument
is that the police first had to view the films in order to determine that they were obscene. He
felt that they had no right to look at the films because they obviously were not gambling paraphernalia. He went on to say:
This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search come upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear
that the contents of the films could not be determined by mere inspection. Id. at 571

(footnote omitted).

133 Letter from James E. Barrett, Attorney General of Wyoming, to Duke W. Dunbar,
Attorney General of Colorado, Oct. 9. 1969.
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warrant was drafted and a concentrated effort was made to find the
county judge in Aspen. The judge could not be found and the weather
conditions were such that a trip to Glenwood Springs would have taken
hours. Faced with this situation the officers entered the house to arrest
the participants only to find that the drugs had been consumed and most
of the violators had departed during the time that a warrant was being
sought. Even if the officers had found narcotics upon their entry, they
risked having this evidence suppressed as being the fruit of a Chimel
violation in spite of the fact that no one was available to issue a search
warrant.
It surely does not tax the imagination to foresee cases in which quick action
by the police is essential but in which there will be no person available who
is authorized to issue search warrants. On this critical point the Chimel majority
is completely silent.
E.

Chimel and the Imminent Destruction or Loss of Evidence

If police work were a leisurely process in which each step could be calculated in advance, the expansion of the warrant requirement mandated by
Chimel would be eminently reasonable. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Often policemen must act quickly or risk losing evidence necessary to convict
a violator. This is particularly true in the area of narcotics enforcement, where
swift action is often necessary because of the ease and rapidity with which narcotics may be consumed or destroyed.
The following is an account13" of a case that occurred in Dade County,
Florida, after the Chimel decision was announced.
Example # 9. On October 18, 1969, at approximately 2:40 A.M.
in an unincorporated area of Dade County, Florida, where rapes of
white females had occurred on the previous Friday night, a police officer
was accompanying a lone white female to her house. As he crossed the
back yard of an apartment building with her, he had occasion to look
into a ground-floor apartment. He observed four white males smoking
homemade cigarettes in the manner characteristic of the marijuana
smoker. A fifth white male was injecting a substance into the arm of a
Negro male. In addition, the police officer, who had been trained in
narcotics, smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana coming through an
open fan vent measuring approximately three feet square.
Based upon this information, the Dade County Police Legal Advisor
advised officers to enter the premises pursuant to the emergency doctrine
and on the separate theories that both a felony was being committed in
the officer's presence and that the officer had reasonable grounds to
134 This account was furnished by Mr. Howard Levine, Legal Advisor, Police Legal Unit,
Dade County Public Safety Department, Dade County, Florida. Letter from Howard Levine to
Frank Carrington, Dec. 1, 1969.
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believe that the evidence of that felony was being destroyed. Obtaining
a search warrant would have been impractical.
After the officers had entered, secured the premises, and properly
advised all the subjects of their constitutional rights, each of the subjects
individually admitted to possessing and smoking marijuana.
On November 25, 1969, a judge of the Criminal Court of Record
of Dade County ordered the evidence seized suppressed on the grounds
that the officers had failed to obtain a search warrant.
In this case the need for haste was apparent, as evidence was being consumed before the officer's eyes. Further, the good faith attempt of the officer
to comply with the law is patent, as indicated by his attempt to secure legal advice
before acting. But, all went for naught; the officer was "second-guessed" and
the evidence was suppressed despite the obvious exigencies of the case. Here,
Chimel's broad language retroactively created a "zone of immunity" protecting
contraband from lawful seizure.
A further example of Chimel's restrictions as applied to narcotics may be
found in the limitations that the case placed on one of the most effective nar3
cotic enforcement devices, the "controlled buy."'

-

Example # 10. The "controlled buy" technique is a procedure
whereby officers use an informant to make a purchase of narcotics. The
informant is first searched to be sure that he has no narcotics in his possession and is then sent to the seller's premises to make a purchase with
marked money. When the informant leaves the seller's premises he is
again searched to make sure that the money is gone; the narcotics he has
purchased are turned over to the officers to be used as evidence. Prior
to Chimel, the officers would immediately enter, arrest the seller, and
search the premises for the marked money and for further narcotics.
It should be obvious that speed is of the essence in these cases,
because if there is any delay the seller may have time to get rid of the
marked money, an essential ingredient in the case against him. Chimel
restricts the arrest-based search to the person of the arrestee and his immediate area, so that officers using the "controlled buy" technique must
hope that they are lucky enough to find the marked money on the person
of the seller. If the seller has secreted it on the premises, it is protected
by Chimel's restrictions on the scope of search. Thus, if the officers act
with the speed necessary in this type of case, their success must be governed by the fortuitous circumstance of whether the pusher placed the
money in his pocket or hid it on the premises.
Of course, once the buy is made the officers may proceed to obtain
a search warrant. But in the time necessary to obtain the warrant, there
is a grave risk that the marked money will be disposed of by the seller,

135 While not describing a specific case, Example 4:10 describes a situation that has been
encountered in the Miami area since Chimel was announced. The source of this information
was Mr. James Jorgenson, Legal Advisor, Police Legal Unit, Dade County Public Safety Department, Dade County, Florida.
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either because, like most of his breed, he is extremely suspicious of all
transactions, or because he has used the marked money to make change
for other buyers.
One who is unfamiliar with the realities of police work could
innocently inquire why the police could not place the seller's premises
under surveillance while a search warrant is being procured. The answer
that any experienced narcotic investigator would give to this question
is that it is usually impossible to get an officer anywhere near such premises, due to the extremely cautious and suspicious nature of those who
traffic in narcotics. The mere presence of a stranger in the neighborhood
would likely alert the seller to get rid of his supply of narcotics and any
money that he had taken in.
The United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of undercover
agents' 36 and informants 3 to gain evidence of crime; but, as a practical matter,
one of the most effective methods of using such techniques has been seriously
curtailed by Chimel, for in many instances that case penalizes the officer for
acting with the swiftness necessitated by the circumstances. The second-level dope
pusher is no one's object of great sympathy, yet because of Chimel one of the
primary methods of making a valid case against these crafty individuals has been
drastically restricted.
F.

Chimel and the "Game Theory"

Mr. justice Clark, dissenting in Chapman v. United States,3 stated that
the inconsistent rules that the Supreme Court has laid down in the search and
seizure cases have turned "crime detection into a game of 'cops and robbers.' ,"'
To those who are involved in the enforcement of the criminal laws of this county,
police work is not a game but a deadly serious business. As noted by Justice
Clark, however, there are reviewing courts which seem to feel that is a gamea game to be governed by the most intricate, rigid, and technical rules. Chimel
is a decision that has presented such courts the widest possible latitude to develop
and refine these technicalities.
Illustrative of this "game theory" is a recent case decided by the Supreme
Court of Illinois, People v. Machroli 4 9
Example # 11. Police officers went to Machroli's room to arrest him
for aggravated battery. Machroli was in his underwear when the officers
entered; an officer handed him his jacket after searching it. The officer
then handed Machroli his pants, but, for some reason, the officer failed
to search the pants. Machroli put the pants on and then removed a metal
box from the pants pocket and put it on a table. The officer took Machroli
136
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Lewis v.United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
365 U.S. 610 (1961).
Id. at 623.
III.
2d -,
254 N.E.2d 450 (1969).
-
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from the room, then returned and secured the metal box, which contained narcotics. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the narcotics
must be suppressed because the officer's search violated the Chimel rule,
since Machroli had been removed from the room.'""
Consider this ruling from the point of view of the officer. If the
officer had taken the box out of the pants before handing them to
Machroli, the search would have been lawful under the Chimel ruling;
even if the officer had searched the pants while they were on Machroli
the seizure would have been lawful since Chimel permits a search of the
arrestee's person. But once Machroli got the box out of the pants and
moved away from it, Chimel is used by the Illinois court to create another
"zone of immunity" around the contraband.
While the nice distinctions made in this case might delight the
hearts of constitutional theorists, they are unrealistic and unfair to an
officer who is attempting to do his job. The courts ought not play "nowyou-may-seize-it, now-you-may-not" with him. It should be emphasized
in this instance that this is not a case of offensive or abusive conduct by
the police officer, nor did the officer conduct a general search. Machroli
was already under arrest, yet the Illinois Supreme Court used Chimel
to insulate the contraband, in effect penalizing the officer because he was
inadvertent in not searching the pants before Machroli had a chance to
attempt to dispose of the narcotics.
Chief Justice Underwood and Justice Crebs dissented strongly in
Machroli, pointing out that it was perfectly natural for the officer to seize
the box after seeing Machroli remove it from the pants." The dissenting
justices showed a great deal more understanding of the realities of police
work th'an did their brothers. 4 '
G. Chimel and the Problem of Other Persons on the Premises
Where the Arrest Is Made
This is perhaps the most perplexing for the police of any of the Chimelrelated problems; for, as was shown in the Denver police amicus brief discussed
above, in a great many cases friends or relatives of the arrestee will make an
effort to dispose of evidence against him. The problem arises where it is impracticable for the police to obtain a search warrant prior to making the arrest
of the suspect, a situation which often arises. The imminent flight of suspects,
the threat of loss of evidence, and the possibility of danger to the officers or
third persons are examples of exigencies that would necessitate an immediate
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Id. at
Id. at -
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254 N.E.2d at 452.
254 N.E.2d at 452-53.

143 The game theory may have reached its zenith in a recent case tried in a municipal court
in San Bernardino, California. Police there arrested a man and a woman after finding heroin in
the diapers of a nine-month-old baby girl. The court refused to admit the heroin into evidence
on the grounds that the search was unconstitutional. According to reports, the court held: "A
baby has the rights of a person.., and therefore must be afforded the protection of the constitution." Denver Post, Jan. 31, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
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entry into premises to make an arrest. .The delay involved in getting a search
warrant could often frustrate the purpose of the arrest.
Once the entry to arrest is made, however, the officers are committed and
any element of surprise is lost. If there are others on the premises the danger of
removal or concealment of evidence, weapons, or contraband is present. If there
is no probable cause to arrest these parties, it is questionable whether the officers
can do anything to prevent the threatened removal or concealment 6f incriminating items. He who believes that persons remaining on the premises will not
attempt to dispose of evidence against the arrestee may be reaching the heights
of starry-eyed naivet6. The police deal with criminals, and the friends and
relatives of the criminals generally know that they are criminals. Further, in
most cases the associates of the arrestee will have no reason to love the police
or to help them in any way.
There are cases, of course, where those on the premises at the time of an
arrest would not desire to dispose of evidence. A mother who has just seen her
young son arrested for selling marijuana at school might very well desire to help
the police find the "stash" in order to get matters straightened out before Junior
gets into deeper trouble. In these cases it is even likely that consent to search
would be given; but such cases are exceptional. If there are associates of the
arrestee present, and a consent search is refused, the officers making the arrest
must, of necessity, take the realistic view that an attempt will be made to dispose
of items incriminating to the arrestee.
The range of practical problems that confront an officer who makes an
arrest with others on the premises is almost unlimited. Many variables may be
involved in such a situation, and we might profitably examine a few.
1. The ratio of persons on the premises to officers. Setting legal
questions aside for the moment, it is clear that if there are more persons
present than officers the officers would have very little chance of keeping
them all under observation. On the other hand, if there are fewer persons
present than officers, the officers are in a much better position to prevent
any tampering with the evidence.
2. The type of evidence involved. Even the hapless officer left
on the premises with five friends of the suspect is in a position to prevent
the removal of, say, stolen tires because of the sheer bulk of these items.
If he observes one of the parties leaving with a tire he can arrest that
person on a charge such as destroying or concealing evidence. 4 4 :The
fact of the matter is, however, that evidence, contraband, or weapons
can often be concealed on the person. Items such as cash, jewelry, papers,
narcotics, betting slips, or small weapons very easily could be removed
from the premises or disposed of while the officer's attention is diverted.
3.

The sex of the persons remaining. As a practical matter a male

144 For example, in California it is a misdemeanor to wilfully destroy or conceal evidence
with the intent of preventing its use in a trial, inquiry, or investigation. CAI;. PENAL COnx §
135 (West 1954).
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officer will 'generally not 'risk searching a woman -because of the threat
of being accused of taking indecent liberties. Unless he believes that she
'is carrying a weapon, an officer will rarely search a woman whom he has
arrested, much less one whom he has no probable cause to arrest. Thus,
if an-officer is left with the arrestee's wife at-the scene of an arrest while
a warrant is being secured, he may be forced to watch the wife walk out
with stolen rings or narcotics in her brassiere or with a pistol tucked
into her girdle.
4.

The type of premises on which the arrest took place. An officer

stationed in a hotel room, or a one-rooom apartment 'while a warrant is

being sought would, of course, be in a much better position to observe
and prevent attempts to dispose of 'contraband or evidence than an officer
stationed in a three-bedroom house. Unfortunately, the police cannot pick
and choose the most convenient premises upon which to make an arrest.
These are a few of the practical problems that are involved when the
question of securing premises arises. Of equal concern are the legal problems;
the question arises whether an officer has the authority to secure premises at all.
The Chimel majority blithely ignored the problem; but Mr. Justice White,
dissenting, did not. He took a dim view of securing premises. In discussing the
feasibility of leaving an officer on the scene while others procured a search warrant, he stated:
Assuming that one policeman from each city would be needed to bring the
petitioner in and obtain a search warrant, one policeman could have been
left to guard the house. However, if he not .only could have remained in the
house against petitioner's wife's will, but followed -her about to assure that

no evidence was being tampered with, the invasion of her privacy would
be almost as great as thataccompanying an actual search. Moreover, had
the wife summoned
an accomplice, one officer could not have watched
45
them both.1

Such language from a dissenting justice in Chimel does not bode well for the

prospect of stationing officers on the premises against the will of the occupants.4 6
The reader is asked to place himself in the position of an officer who is
faced with the following situation:
Example # 12. An arrest has been made in a house under circumstances making it impracticable to obtain a search warrant prior to the
arrest. The arrestee's mother, two brothers, and girl friend (there is no

probable cause to arrest any of these) remain on the premises after the
arrest. There is probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime for
145 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 775 n.5 '(1969).
146 In People v. Edgar, 60 Cal. 2d 171, 383 P.2d 449, 32 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963), the California Supreme Court used language to the effect that officers might remain on the premises
and keep those present under surveillance. In view of the reservations expressed by Mr. Justice White in Chimelt, this authority would seem to be at least questionable.
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which the arrest was made is concealed on the premises. At best it will
take two hours to draft a search warrant and locate a judge to sign it.
Those remaining on the premises are already hostile to the police and
a consent search has been refused in no uncertain terms. Two officers
are left to "secure" the premises. The arrestee's mother orders the officers
to leave. They refuse-but on what grounds?
The arrestee's brothers begin to disperse, each to a separate room.
An officer tells them to remain where they are. They refuse. Each proceeds into a different room. May the officers restrain them? May they
arrest them for refusing to obey them in their own house? If an officer
follows each brother, the mother and girl friend will be left alone.
Each brother returns and starts to leave the house. May the officers
detain them on the premises? May the officers search them? Upon
what authority?
The girl friend tells an officer she has to go to the bathroom. May
he restrain her in view of the fact that she is not under arrest?
These are just a few of the practical problems that could be encountered by
officers faced with such a situation-problems for which there axe simply no
answers. Further, the problem goes deeper than the preservation of evidence
for a criminal prosecution. The question also arises whether an officer is risking
civil liability for remaining on an individual's premises against the will of that
individual or for interfering with the liberty of persons whom there is no probable
cause to arrest. 41 Arguably, tort actions for false imprisonment, assault, battery,
or invasion of privacy could lie against the officers who restrained or forcibly
searched a person under such circumstances.
Currently it appears to be "open season" on police officers through the
filing of civil suits of highly questionable validity. 4 Based on the writer's experience with the Denver police department, the threat of baseless civil suits filed
against officers for simply doing their jobs is the biggest morale factor affecting
the police today. Now, Chimel, as written, would seem to require police officers
to expose themselves further to civil liability in order to protect evidence in those
cases where securing premises is necessary.
H.

Chimel and Police Manpower

During one twenty-four-hour period in September of 1969, eight cases of
forcible rape were reported in Denver, including one case in which the victim
required sixty to seventy stitches in order to close her face and head cuts." o
In one eight-day period in December of 1969, 302 burglaries took place in
Denver in which property valued at $80,000.00 was taken.'
Denver is far
147 See note 76 supra.
148 This is illustrated by a civil suit alleging "unreasonable search and seizure" recently filed
against two Denver police officers. The officers' "unreasonable" conduct consisted of seeing
through an open, uncurtained window into a house from the porch of that house, under circum
stances in which the officers had a right and duty to be on the porch.
149 Rocky Mountain News, Sept. 8, 1969, at 12.
150 Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 11, 1970, at 7.
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from having an unusually high crime rate, but, ike most cities, Denver is gravely
underpoliced in the face of rising crime.' The need for policemen on the street
is critical.
The expanded warrant system required by Chimel will require that the
police spend less time in patrol and investigation and more time in drafting
affidavits and search warrants and in presenting them to magistrates. Another
Denver case will illustrate this:
Example # 13. At about 4:30 P.m. on July 16, 1969, a citizen
called the Denver police to advise that some young men were drying
marijuana on a third-floor fire escape of the apartment building next to
hers. Officers viewed the marijuana from the informant's apartment; and,
after putting a watch on the marijuana, called the Denver police Legal
Coordinator to draft a search warrant for the apartment that fronted
on the fire escape.
At about 6:40 P.m. the officers watching the fire escape reported
that two youths had removed the drying marijuana from the fire escape
and were now leaning out of the window of the apartment smoking
brown-paper rolled cigarettes.
The legal coordinator felt that this was sufficient evidence of consumption of contraband to justify a warrantless entry to arrest those
who had been seen smoking the homemade cigarettes. Six police officers
and the legal coordinator proceeded to the apartment, entered, and arrested six parties therein for possession of marijuana.
Marijuana, other drugs, and narcotics implements were found in
plain view upon entry. Prior to Chimel, an arrest-based search of the
apartment at this time would clearly have been permissible; after Chimel,
question arose as to whether or not a search warrant was now necessary
to search further in the apartment. Electing the "safest" course, the
legal coordinator decided to draft a new search warrant for the apartment
in order to search for other narcotics not in plain view.
With six prisoners to guard (one was a methedrine addict recently
released from a mental hospital who stated he would be killed before he
was arrested again) it was necessary to leave four officers on the premises.
The legal coordinator and two officers drafted a search warrant and,
after several attempts, found a judge at home who could sign the warrant. No further search of the premises was made until the warrant
was secured.
The search warrant was signed by the judge, returned to the premises,
and executed. A small additional amount of marijuana was discovered.
The entire transaction took from one and one-half to two and onehalf hours.

In this case the "safe" course of conduct, taken in order to prevent
suppression of evidence under a broad application of the Chimel rule,
kept six officers off the street for about two hours each. Under pre151

See Denver Post, Jan. 8, 1970, at 30, cols. 1-8.
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Chimel standards the efitry and arrest-based search could have been
accomplished in a half hour.
Twelve hours of lost patrol time may seem to be a de minimis argument at
first glance; but when this loss of time is multiplied by similar incidents in other
cities across the country, the loss of police time occupied in drafting, securing,
executing, and returning search warrants is considerable. In addition, the "dead
time" consumed by officers waiting for the arrival of a search warrant must be
considered. In a letter responding to questions concerning the impact of Chimel
on his department, Chief E. M. Davis of the Lbs Angeles police department
commented on the manpower problems raised by Chimel: "The problem factor
lies in the expenditure of numerous man hours where it becomes necessary to
leave officers on the premises of suspected wrongdoers."' 52
The Supreme Court of the United States has never recognized logistical
problems such as police manpower shortages as a valid argument when it is
engaged in pursuing the vindication of individual rights, yet it is submitted that
such considerations ought be recognized by the Court. This nation is experiencing
a crime wave, a street crime wave, of unprecedented proportions. The police
are needed on the street to stem this rise in crime both by apprehending criminals
and through the pure deterrent factor of a visible force on the street. The
Court's pursuit of constitutional protections in theory must, of necessity, result
in a decrease of that actual protection the public expects from the police.
The problems described are examples of only a few areas in which Chimel,
and cases like it, can cause legal and practical difficulties for the working policeman. This article deals, in large measure, with only a few instances in one police
department in the relatively short time since Chimel was announced, but the
problems described illustrate the enormous chasm, noted by Senator McClellan,
defined by an 18th-century ideal, but applied to a
between "individual rights
153
20th-century society."
A realistic appreciation of these problems led Mr. Justice Clark to say
in 1961:
It is disastrous to law enforcement to leave at large the inconsistent rules
laid down in these [search and seizure] cases. It turns the wellsprings of
democracy--law and order-into a slough of frustration. It turns crime
detection into a game of "cops and robbers." We hear much these days of
an increasing crime rate'and a breakdown in law enf6rcement. Some place
the blame on police officers. I say there are others that must shoulder
much of that responsibility.'5 4
III.

A Proposed Solution

From the point of view of the police, all of the problems created by-Chimel
could be resolved by a return to the more flexible Rabinowitz-Harrisstandard.
152 Letter from E. M. Davis, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, to John P.
Forhan, Dec. 11, 1969, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
153 115 CONG. REc. S9566 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1969); see text accompanying note 3 supra.
154 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 623 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
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Perhaps this may lie in the future, for if anything is certain in this area of the
law, it is that the rules are constantly shifting. Thre can be no question that,
as of this writing, the.makeup of the Court is changing;' 5 and, while no professional policeman could, or should, expect the Court to "rubber-stamp" police
desires, the Court's future criminal law decisions may very well show a more
realistic approach to police problems. It is not inconceivable that, at some later
date, Mr. Justice White's dissent in Chimel may become the law.
Assuming that a rapid 'reversal of the Chimel rule w1l not be immediately
forthcqming, those who might wish to alleviate some of the adverse.impact of that
decision on the police appear to have two courses. Tie first alternative would
see the Congress of the United States examine Chimel and its effects and then
enact legislation to "overrfle" the decision, as was done in section 701 of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,156 which greatly limited
the scope of Miranda v. Arizona,"" dealing with confessions, and the WadeGilbert-Stovall.. trilogy dealing with eyewitness identification. 9
Congressional action taken specifically to lessen the impact of Supreme
Court decisions on the police'is admittedly rather drastic action, but the rise of
crime in this country may demand drastic action.'
Certainly, a Congress-Supreme Court confrontation raises one of the most fascinating, important, and
controversial issues in government, but the question.is of constitutional dimensions
beyond the scope of this article. It is submitted,, however, that even within the
Chimel opinion there is latitude for legislation dr judge-made rtiles of criminal
procedure that would resolve many of the. problems described in this article.
This is the second course available to those who wish to resolve some of the
difficulties attending Chimel. The remainder of this article will consider the
possible legislation or rules.
The suggested rule' . proceeds on the assumption that where it is practicable for the police to obtain a search warrant (as it was in the Chimel case
itself) they must do so. The rule deals with those cases in which it is not practicable for the police to procure a search warrant prior to making an arrest; the
rule would supply the guidelines for police conduct in this. area omitted from
the Chimel opinion. As will be shown, a detailed analysis of the Chimel opinion
furnishes ample authority for the guidelines .in the proposed rule; the police,
however, need these guidelines spelled out rather than buried in an opinion.
155 Chief Justice Warren Burger has replaced Earl Warren and Mr. Justice Blackmun now
sits in the seat vacated by Abe Fortas.,
156 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-02 (Supp. IV, 1965-68).'

157 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

158 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 '(1967).
159 Of course, federal legislation directly affects only the federal court system; nevertheless,
such congressional action can act as an effective precedent for the states to follow.
160 Most recently, the Senate has passed, overwhelmingly, the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1969, S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), title VII of which "overrules" Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). This provision is currently under consideration by the
the House Judiciary Committee.
161 The suggested response to Chimel could be adopted in the form of a statute or as a
court-made rule of criminal procedure where this is permitted. For convenience, the term
"rule" will be used hereafter in this article, although the word "statute" could be read for
"rule' throughout.
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Only then can the police know how to act properly, and only then will there
be a basis for uniform application of Chimel by the courts.
The proposed rule will be referred to as the "warrant-if-practicable" rule
and may be stated as follows:
Scope of Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest
(A) Articles or evidence seized pursuant to a search made incident
to a lawful arrest shall be admissible evidence in any criminal prosecution
if the tearch was limited to (1) the person arrested, and (2) the immediate area of the person arrested.
(B) Articles or evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest beyond the scope permitted by section (A) of
this rule shall not be admissible evidence in any criminal prosecution
unless the trial judge finds as a fact that (1) in the circumstances of the
case it was not reasonably practicable for the officer or officers to obtain
a search warrant, and (2) there was probable cause to believe that
weapons, contraband, or other evidence were located on the premises on
which the arrest took place.
(C) The trial judge, in determining whether it was reasonably practicable for the officer or officers to obtain a search warrant, shall take into
consideration all the circumstances existing at the time of the arrest,
including:
(1) The reasonable probability that weapons, contraband, or
evidence would be destroyed, removed, concealed, or otherwise
disposed of while a search warrant was being procured;
(2) The reasonable probability of danger to the officers or to
third persons if the search were delayed while a search warrant was
being procured;
(3) The reasonable probability that the person to be arrested
would flee or escape while a search warrant was being procured;
(4) The availability of a judicial officer empowered to issue
search warrants; and
(5) Any other circumstances that would indicate to a prudent
man that the delay involved in procuring a search warrant would
render fruitless a subsequent search.
The presence or absence of any of the above circumstances need not be
conclusive on the issue of the reasonable practicability of obtaining a
search warrant.
The rule seeks to codify those circumstances under which a warrantless, arrestbased search would be permissible in light of the Chimel opinion. The primary
concern in an analysis of the proposed rule, then, must be whether the rule is
consistent with the Chimel opinion.
Obviously, section (A) of the proposed rule comports with Chimel since it
merely restates the holding in Chimel that the person of the arrestee and his
immediate area may be searched incident to an arrest. Section (B) emphasizes
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that a search warrant is necessary to search further but also brings in the exceptions to the Chimel rule and deals with the concept of "reasonable practicability."
At this point, it is necessary to turn to the Chimel majority opinion in order to
ascertain whether it will brook such an exception.
The "reasonable practicability" argument is based on the premise that when
Chimel overruled United States v. Rabinowitz,' it revived Trupiano u. United
States,6 ' a case Rabinowitz had overruled. The Court in Trupiano enunciated
the rule of reasonable practicability. In that case federal revenue agents had kept
a still under surveillance by observation and through an undercover agent from
May thirteenth to June eighth of 1946. On June eighth, without securing either
an arrest warrant or a search warrant, the agents conducted a raid and arrested
one Antionole, whom they caught tending the still. Trupiano and other defendants were arrested later at the still. The Supreme Court held that the arrest
of Antionole was lawful but that the seizure of the still was unlawful because the
agents did not procure a search warrant though they had ample time to do so
prior to the arrest. The key language in Trupiano was quoted by Mr. Justice
Stewart writing for the majority in Chimel:
"It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement
agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.... This rule rests upon the desirability of having magistrates rather
than police officers determine when searches and seizures are permissible
and what limitations should be placed upon such activities.... To provide
the necessary security against unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives
of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amendment required adherence to
judicial processes wherever possible. And subsequent history has confirmed
the wisdom of that requirement.
"A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest
has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the
inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must
be something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest."
[334 U.S.] at 705, 708.16- (Emphasis added.)
This language from Trupiano, quoted with approval in Chimel, clearly deals
with the practicalities of securing a search warrant; it recognizes that there are
cases in which "the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest"
should permit a warrantless, arrest-based search.' 65 This emphasis on practicability takes on added significance when one recalls that in the Chimel case itself
there was ample time for the police to procure a search warrant prior to making
the arrest and that the police clearly had sufficient probable cause to support such
a warrant. Thus, the Chimel case itself would have been unaffected by the proposed warrant-if-practicable rule, since there it was practicable to obtain a search
warrant.
Further support for the premise that in certain limited situations a search
of premises may be made without warrant is found in two United States Supreme
162 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
163 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
164 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758-59 (1969).
165 Mr. Justice White also mentioned the practicability concept in his dissenting opinion.
See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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Court cases, McDonald v. United States166 and Warden v. Hayden. 6 McDonald
is often cited as the case that enunciated the doctrine of "exigent circumstances"
as an exception to the warrant rule. There the police had had the defendant, a
known numbers operator, under surveillance for several months. On the day of
the raid the officers surrounded defendant's rooming house, entered the house,
and followed the sound of adding machines until they came to the room where
the numbers operation was being conducted. Looking over the transom, they
observed McDonald and another engaged in the numbers business; they entered
the room, arrested the operators, and seized the wagering paraphernalia. The
Supreme Court reversed McDonald's conviction, saying: "Where, as here,
officers are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling reasons to
justify the absence of a search warrant. A search without a warrant demands
exceptional circumstances .... ." The Court then went on to hold that officers
seeking to justify a search without a warrant must be prepared to show "that the
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative."' 6 9 A similar showing is
required by the proposed rule.
Warden u. Hayden, decided by the Supreme Court in 1967, is further
authority for the premise that warrantless searches are sometimes permissible. In
that case an armed robber held up a Baltimore taxicab company, taking an
166 335 U.S. 451 (1948). A recent example of the exigent circumstances doctrine is Dorman
v. United States, 7 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 2107 (D.C. Cir., April 15, 1970) '(en banc). Police
made a warrantless search of an armed robbery suspect's home four hours after the crime, and
evidence seized during the search was held admissible by the court sitting en banc. The police
entered the house to search for and arrest the suspect; they were not entering merely to search
for evidence. Moreover, police had attempted to obtain a search warrant, but no magistrate was
available to issue one. The panel which originally heard Dorman's appeal held the search
unreasonable. Jones v. United States, 5 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 2124 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 1969),
rev'd sub nom. Dorman v. United States, 7 BNA CGlM. L. RPTR. 2107 (D.C. Cir. April 15,
1970). The court, sitting en banc, considered the warrantless search reasonable and discussed
the factors influencing its opinion:
First, that a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence.
Second, and obviously inter-related, that the suspect is reasonably believed to be
armed. Delay in arrest of an armed felon may well increase danger to the community
meanwhile, or to the officers at time of arrest. This consideration bears materially on
the justification for a warrantless entry.
Third, that there exists not merely the minimum of probable cause, that is
requisite even when a warrant has been issued, but beyond that a clear showing of
probable cause, including "reasonably trustworthy information," to believe that the
suspect committed the crime involved.
Fourth, strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered.
Fifth, a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended.
Sixth, the circumstance that the entry, though not consented, is made peaceably.
Forcible entry may in some instances be justified. But the fact that entry was not
forcible aids in showing reasonableness of police attitude and conduct.
Another factor to be taken into account, though it works in more than one
direction, relates to time of entry-whether it is made at night. On the one hand,
as we shall later develop, the late hour may underscore the delay (and perhaps
impracticability of) obtaining a warrant, and hence serve to justify proceeding without
one. On the other hand, the fact that an entry is made at night raises particular
concern over its reasonableness, . . . and may elevate the degree of probable cause
required, both as implicating the suspect, and as showing that he is in the place
entered .... Dorman v. United States, supra, at 2108.
167 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Both MacDonald and Warden v. Hayden are indirectly cited in
Chimel as exceptions to the warrant requirement. See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
168 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
169 Id. at 456.
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amount of cash and fleeing. Two taxi drivers followed the robber, Hayden, to a
certain house and radioed to their dispatcher a description of the robber and the
clothes that he was wearing. The dispatcher notified police, who arrived at the
house within minutes, knocked on the door, and, when Mrs. Hayden answered,
informed her that they believed a robber was inside and that they wanted to
search the house. Mrs. Hayden made no objection. The officers spread throughout the house, searching two floors and the basement for the robber and his
weapons. They found Hayden in bed feigning sleep hnd arrested him. Mean.:
while, other officers had found a pistol and a shotgun in the flush tank of the
toilet, clothes such as the robber had worn in a washing machine in the cellar,
ammunition and a cap under the mattress of Hayden's bed, and shotgun ammunition in a bureau drawer in Hayden's room.
All of these items were introduced into evidence at Hayden's trial, and he
was convicted of robbery.- On appeal; the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayden's
conviction,"' sustaining the search itself but holding that the clothing seized
constituted "mere evidence," which was not subject to seizure. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on the "mere evidence" question and upheld Hayden's conviction. The Supreme Court, in sustaining the
search said:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search for him without warrant was
invalid. Under the circumstances
17 of this case, "the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative.'1 '
The Court further stated that the search of the entire house for weapons was
lawful:
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course
of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives
of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house
for persons andweapons could have insured ,that Hayden was the only man
present and-that the police had control
72 of all weapons which could be used
against them or to effect an escape.'
The Court then assumed, but it did not decide, that the exigencies of the case
only permitted a search for weapons; even under such an assumption it was held
that the clothes found were found in a bona fide search for weapons and that
the seizure of the clothes was lawful. ' '_Having found the search lawful, the
Court then overruled the doctrine of Gouled v. United States. 4 that items of
evidentiary value only could not be seized.
Considering McDonald and Warden v. Hayden together we see two extremes of police conduct. Clearly, officers who have conducted months of surveillance, as in McDonald, have no excuse for not procuring a search warrant;
170 Hayden v. Warden, 363 F.2d 647 '(4th Cir, 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
171 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
172 Id. at 298-99.
173 Id. at 299-300.
174 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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equally clearly, officers in hot pursuit need not delay their investigations to seek
a search warrant.175 The proposed warrant-if-practicable rule seeks to establish
and clarify a middle ground in which officers may properly proceed without a
warrant if they can show that the circumstances of the case justify such conduct.
Section (C) of the proposed rule seeks to list some of the circumstances
that might create a "reasonable impracticability" of obtaining a search warrant.
These are common-sense standards; hopefully, they would not be subjected to
hypertechnical interpretation. The first two factors, threatened loss of evidence
and danger to officers or third persons, are sanctioned by McDonald and Warden
v. Hayden. There is also ample authority in the federal courts of appeals for
the inclusion of such considerations.Y The third factor listed in section (C),
the unavailability of an issuing magistrate, must be considered in the context of
the other exigencies discussed above; at least one federal court has held that the
fact that a magistrate is unavailable has a bearing on the practicability of obtain1 7
ing a search warrant. 1
The fourth circumstance to be taken into consideration under the proposed
rule is directed at situations where the delay in procuring a search warrant would
render the subsequent search futile. This section is based on an opinion by Mr.
Justice White, writing for a majority of the Court in Camara v. Municipal
Court.17 Discussing the fourth amendment's requirement of search warrants,
Mr. Justice White stated that
the question is not whether the police interest justifies the type of search in
question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a
warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the

search.1 19 (Emphasis added.)

Some of the examples presented in this article lend emphasis to the need for such
an exception to the warrant requirement. The fourth amendment was drafted
to prevent abuses by the police, but there was never an intent to create wide
"zones of immunity" for certain violators or to completely insulate some evidence
from lawful seizure.
Finally, it should be noted that, in addition to a showing of "impracticability," the proposed rule would require the police to show that there was probable
cause to believe that weapons, contraband, or evidence were located on the
premises.
In summary, then, the warrant-if-practicable rule carves out a limited area
in which the police can be assured that they may act properly in securing evidence
175 See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963). In State v. Sutton, 7 BNA CRIM.
L. RPTR. 2047 (Mo. Mar. 9, 1970), the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the admission of
evidence seized during a warrantless search not incident to arrest on the grounds that the
officers' search of a house was "justified by the exigencies of the situation and in fact demanded
by the nature of their duties as peace and law enforcement officers."
176 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 260 F.2d 125, 128 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 918 (1959); United States v. Games, 258 F.2d 530, 532 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 937 (1959); Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
177 United States v. Pierce, 124 F. Supp. 264, 266 (N.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd mem., 224 F.2d
281 (6th Cir. 1955).

178

387 U.S. 523 (1967).

179

Id. at 533.
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which otherwise might be lost due to the particular circumstances of the case.
The rule does not permit the police to circumvent the warrant requirement where
it is practicable to obtain a search warrant; the rule does give the police some
guidelines for proper action when it is not reasonably practicable for them to
secure a search warrant. The warrant-if-practicable rule would have permitted,
for example, an arrest-based search -for the murder weapons in each of the
homicide cases described in the Denver police aniicus brief; in the second of
those cases, where the police knew that a weapon was removed by the defendant's
friends, the proposed rule almost assuredly would have resulted in the lawful
seizure of a vital piece of evidence.
IV.

Conclusion

This article represents a police-oriented response to Chimel v. California.
Decisions such as Chimel-sweepingly prohibitive but containing no guidelines
for proper police action, expansive in the theoretical protection of the individual's
liberties but unmindful of the problems created for those charged with protecting
the individual's safety-do little to improve our criminal justice system. It is a
decision which merits police response. If this response consists only of generalized
grumbling about being "handcuffed," then it serves no function at all. To be
effective, police response must first isolate and define the problem and then, if
possible, present a workable solution. That has been the object of this article.

